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Abstract
The Canadian International Development Agency plays an integral role in the promoting
of democracy abroad. In fact, CIDA has spent more than $1 billion in meaningful
democratic aid since 1990 on both multilateral and bilateral programmes. Despite this,
CIDA policies are not conducive to developing effective and quality projects in recipient
nations, due to the secretive nature of the institution. This study examines the
organization’s “Democracy Project Database,” which contains the listing of all
democracy projects for all nations from 1990-2005. Additionally, it evaluates the
availability of reports and conducts interviews with CIDA personnel. Various CIDA
human rights and democracy programme studies, CIDA project evaluations and the
Auditor General’s reports are all examined to provide a comprehensive view on the
agency. The findings illustrate that while CIDA does distribute more funds to more
democratizing nations, aid is greatly dispersed and this results in a loss of effectiveness.
In addition, no comprehensive database of information exists to the public, with reports
that are often done on an ad hoc basis. The OAG reports indicate that the organization,
in the past, has not been evaluating their programmes and much of the information is
informal in nature. Yet, it is only through evaluations that a knowledge process can
occur. CIDA cannot learn from its mistakes and this is also evident from the interview
process. The interview phase of this study elicited little participation from CIDA
officials and the personal experiences of the author also reinforced the closed-nature of
the institution. This creates an obvious problem with donor coordination, cooperation
and learning. It also produces difficulties in fund distribution. Results indicate that
CIDA has overpaid for certain agreements and has even released ineligible expenses to
executing agencies. Together, the faulty fund disbursals, inadequate evaluation methods,
and lack of concentration of assistance have created an institution that is not effective at
promoting democracy. Interview and programme reports indicate that democracy
projects need to increase the recipient government’s involvement, the sustainability of
funds, and more localized involvement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Canadian International Development Agency plays an integral role in the
international community with respect to foreign aid, as evidenced by the myriad of
different programmes in more than 150 nations. While Canada has yet to attain the 0.7
per cent of gross domestic product that was targeted for foreign aid by former Canadian
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, Canada still spends a considerable amount of money.
In fact, according to the Auditor General’s 2005 report, CIDA manages nearly $2.6
billion each year, spending money on program expenditures such as contracts,
contributions, grants and transfer payments.1 More specifically, CIDA has spent more
than $1 billion in “meaningful democratic aid” from 1990 to 2005 in both multilateral
and bilateral programming. There is no denying that democracy aid plays an important
role within Canada foreign aid, yet this remains a remarkably understudied field.
Consequently, this thesis will examine the effects of CIDA policy on their democracy
promotion strategies.

It will be argued that CIDA policies are not conducive to the

meaningful and effective strategies that are needed to develop good quality programming
and projects in recipient nations, due to the secretive nature of the institution. Firstly, an
examination of aid levels in democratizing countries proved difficult to compile, with
results indicating that aid is greatly dispersed, affecting the individual programme’s
ability to be effective.

Secondly, the interview phase of the study elicited little

participation from CIDA officials, showing the need for the organization to be more open
and transparent.

Finally, the Auditor General reports, the consultation process of the

1 OAG, “2005 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 5 - Status Report, Canadian International
Development Agency: Financial Complaince Audits and Managing Contracts and Contributions,” [online];
available from w w w .oag-bvg.gc.ca, 5.8

1
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report on Canada Making a Difference in the World, and various CIDA documents
indicate this closed nature, while also revealing specific faults within funding initiatives
like sole-source contracting and project sustainability.
While originally this thesis set out to examine the effectiveness of specific
democracy aid programs and projects, early on, it became evident that this would be a
very difficult task to accomplish. To begin with, democracy promotion activities are
noted to have only modest impacts on recipient nations, as the very root of
democratization is an internal process. 2 Additionally, scholars have shown the distinct
•

*

difficulties with consolidating data in this area, attributable partly to the inherent
problems o f measuring and examining democratization and donor policies.

In fact,

Thomas Carothers has found that the majority of information in this area is informal in
nature.4 This informal type of knowledge presents the greatest obstacle for consolidation
of important data and the author’s visit to the 2004 CIDA International Cooperation Days
proves this to be true.
At the opening ceremonies of the International Cooperation Days, a man sat next
to the author and engaged in a small conversation. He worked for an NGO, but as soon
as he realized that the individual he was speaking to was a student and not CIDA
personnel, the mood quickly changed and the author was sitting alone. In fact, this would
be evident throughout the conference. Much time was given to the networking between
the NGOs and the organization, yet this small personal story indicates the weary and

2 Gordon Crawford, Foreign A id and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis o f Democracy Assistance
and Political Conditionality, (Palgrave, 2001), 231
’ Gordon Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance through Development
Aid, (Leeds: Leeds University Press, 1996), vi.
4 Thomas Carothers, A iding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 1999), 9

2
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closed nature attitudes of both participants. This is not surprising, however, as CIDA has
endured much criticism throughout the years. A recent study of Canadian democratic aid
has found that while Canada does have much to offer, “Canadian efforts remain
disparate, underfunded, and often anonymous” with little sense of “Canadian-ness”.5
Moreover, the Auditor General reports indicate an organization wrought with
inconsistencies and problematic policies, especially with respect to documentation and
evaluation of programming. Such negative findings influence the views of the public and
politicians, potentially affecting the levels of funding for CIDA.
At the conference, it became quite clear that democratization did not play a
significant role, as evidenced by the focus on the Millennium Development Goals. The
rare mention of democratization was employed within a larger context of poverty and
development sustainability. For example, guest speaker, Jeffrey Sachs, illustrated the
relationship between poverty and governments, noting that undemocratic regimes like the
Taliban or terrorist groups like A1 Quaeda are the result of poverty and not the cause.6
Aileen Carroll recognized the need to prioritize and include greater harmonization efforts,
but only mentioned the concept of “governance” and its related democratic intentions in
passing.7

These brief non-focused discussions of democratization policies and

democracy aid reflect a continued reluctance by CIDA to deal with these issues, calling
for a need of greater understanding of the organization and its policies. An examination
of the history of CIDA proves this to be the case, as well.

5 Leslie Campbell, “Democracy Canada: turning Canadian Democratic Values and Experiences into
International Action,” Hemisphere Focus, vol xii (4) (January 13, 2004): 3
6 Jeffrey Sachs, “Plenary Session: Why This UN Strategy Matters Now?” 2004 International Cooperation
Days, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 November, 2004.
7 Aileen Carroll, “Opening Ceremony,” 2004 International Cooperation Days, Ottawa, Ontario, 1
November, 2004.

3
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According to Ann Griffith’s examination of Canadian policy in the Visegrad
Countries, it was found that “democracy was scarcely mentioned in the House of
Commons from 1950 to 1990, and when it was mentioned it was invariably by the
Opposition in a domestic context.”8 Moreover, the rare time it was cited, she notes that
the policy was negative in nature, used only a means to ensure that nations did not fall
prey to the influence of the Soviet Union.9 In fact, this idea was popular all over the
world, as a true democracy promoting regime did not exist until recently. It is argued that
democracy promotion evolved out the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Break-up of the Soviet
Union and the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization.10 As countries during
this “third wave” moved towards greater democratic systems of government, there was
room and even need for greater international involvement and aid. Carothers argues that
as these events progressed, democracy promotion reflected both a moral and practical
interest to the donor nation.11
There has been an evolution throughout the years of Canadian strategies and
assistance.

Robert Miller’s feasibility report on Canada’s role in strengthening

democratic institutions finds that prior to the mid 1980s, not much attention was given to
• advancement. 12 More
economic development and very little was done on actual political
importantly, he found that Canada should take a more active role in this area and
consequently, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
(ICHRDD) was created in 1988. Now known as Rights & Democracy, this organization

8 Ann L. Griffiths, “Creating Sustainable Democracy? Canadian Policy in the Visegrad Countries in the
Post-Cold War Period,” (Ph.D. diss., Dalhousie University, 1997), 223
9 Ibid, 224
10 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 4
11 Ibid, 5
12 Robert Miller, Canada and Democratic Development, (International Development Research Centre,
1985), 5

4
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is partly funded by the government of Canada to help initiate and encourage both
i o

democratic and human rights support.

Even from Rights & Democracy, it is evident

that human rights and democratic development is not as influential as other aid areas. In
fact, Gerald Schmitz notes the relatively small amount of funding this specific
organization receives, questioning its ability to maintain visibility.14 Today, there is an
increased awareness and focus on democracy promotion, with the recognition of the need
to build more compassionate, effective and generous democratic aid programmes.
CIDA’s role within the international development context is quite complex,
dealing with a multitude of different areas. For example, CIDA’s development results
are listed into four main areas, including economic well-being, social development,
environmental sustainability, and governance which includes the “enhanced respect for
human rights and democracy.”15 Clearly in the 2003-2004 Departmental Performance
Report, CIDA’s main mandate is to “support sustainable development in order to reduce
poverty” and “support democratic development and economic liberalization” with an
emphasis on reducing both international and domestic threats to security.16 Democratic
aid has grown from its initial emphasis on the Soviet Union and Eastern European
perspective to include countries like Iraq and Afghanistan as recent major democracy aid
recipients. In fact, three of the five major democracy aid recipients based on aggregate
totals from 1990-2005 are China, Vietnam and Indonesia. In these nations, CIDA has

13 Department o f Justice, “An Act to Establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development,” R.S., 1985, c. 54 (4lh Supp.) [1988, c64, assented to 30 September, 1988]; [online];
available from http;//laws/justice.gc.ca/ point 4(1)
14 Gerald Schmitz, “The Role o f International Democracy Promotion in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” IRPP
Policy Matters, vol 5(10) (2004): 16
15 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) 2004-2005 CIDA Estimates,
[online]; available from www.tbs-sct.gc.ca
16 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Canadian International Development Agency: Departmental
Performance Report (DPR) 2003-2004, [online]; available from www.tbs-sct.gc.ca
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pledged to further the trinity of “human rights, democracy and good governance” by
increasing accountability, improving the rule of law, increasing popular participation and
strengthening institutions and “the will of leaders to respect rights, rule democratically
and govern effectively.”17 It is evident that the area of democracy promotion is a large
area for Canada to carve out its niche. Canada has the potential to be a major player in
the democracy aid category.

Only by understanding the successes and limitation of

CIDA, as an organization, can Canada improve the effectiveness of its democratic aid
programme. Only by understanding the lack of interest and the closed-nature reporting of
this area can CIDA develop the good quality programming that recipient nations both
need and deserve.
This thesis sets out to examine Canadian democracy promotion strategies within
the CIDA context. In order to do this, the Canadian International Development Agency
will be examined, as the organization is an important part of measuring the effectiveness
of programming. The following chapter will discuss the concepts of the terms of this
study, like democracy, CIDA and effectiveness. It will also examine the literature review
in this area, showing how there is a void in studies of Canadian democratic aid. Chapter
3 will discuss the methodology used. This will consist of examining the “Democracy
Project Database”, various human rights and democracy programme reports, CIDA
evaluations, the Auditor General’s findings and an interview portion. In chapter 4, the
results will be revealed. It will become evident that CIDA is not a transparent and open
agency and this has resulted in faulty evaluation methods and, consequently, faulty
programming. Chapter 5 is the discussion and here it will become clear that the results fit

17 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) 2002-2003 CIDA Estimates,
[online]; available from www.tbs-sct.gc/est

6
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in with the generalized work of Carothers and the other researchers who find that the area
of democracy aid has many difficulties. It also agrees with the existing literature on
CIDA, an organization that has been portrayed as having multiple departmental
deficiencies.

Finally, the last chapter summarizes the entire study, illustrating the

limitations and areas of further research.

7
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The area of democracy promotion strategies is considerably understudied.
Despite the vast sums of moneys invested into promoting democracy abroad, researchers
note the need to examine this area of study more closely.

In fact, Hakan Yilmaz,

Marshall Conley and Daniel Livermore, Gordon Crawford, Peter Burnell and Thomas
Carothers have all called for more organized knowledge and research.1 From this
literature review, it will become obvious that there is a large void in the Canadian
literature, specifically with respect to CIDA. No studies have attempted to examine the
rationales behind Canadian democratic aid or the evaluation of programme effectiveness.
What emerges from this literature is an organization that does not clearly discuss the
benefits of democratization, illustrating the secondary nature of this type of aid in
Canada. Moreover, CIDA is portrayed as a highly bureaucratic organization that has
been less than successful in meeting its objectives. Consequently, this chapter will define
the terms and concepts of democracy and CIDA. It will first examine why democracy is
encouraged and how it is defined by the organization. It will then go on to discuss the
literature on CIDA and how the effectiveness of democracy has been measured in the
past. It will examine the literature on democracy promotion strategies, followed by an
investigation of developmental aid and democracy, illustrating the main hypotheses of
this thesis.
1 Hakan Yilmaz, “External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model o f
Democratic Change,” Democratization, vol 9(2) (Summer 2002): 68, Marshall Conley and Daniel
Livermore, “Human Rights, Development and Democracy: The Linkage Between Theory and Practice,”
Canadian Journal o f Development Studies, (Special Issue, 1996): 23, Gordon Crawford, Promoting
Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance through Development A id v i. Peter Burnell, ed.,
Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation fo r Democratization, (London: Frank Cass Publishers,
2000), 47, Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 2

8
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An examination of democracy promotion strategies is not complete without an
examination of what democracy entails. Dankwart Rustow argues that democratization is
a unique process and it becomes evident from the literature review that there are many
categories, sub-categories and divisions within the term. Despite this fact, it is assumed
-3

by Ghia Nodia that there is a “universal and general” assumption of “democracy”.
While definitions and understanding of the term may be “vague and superficial”, he
argues that there are a number of characteristics that people, in general, tend to associate
with it.4 The following section will focus on these definitional aspects within the context
of democracy promoting strategies. It will, first, discuss the reasons why democracy is
encouraged in transitional and non-democratic nations. Secondly, it will compare the
different definitional paths of the term “democracy”, including an examination of the
consolidation o f it.

Finally, the terms are put within the perspective of this thesis,

specifically examining what foreign aid and democracy aid entails and how CIDA has
failed to develop an appropriate context for these terms.
Why Democracy?
Democracy is encouraged by the Western world for many reasons.

It has

generally been regarded as a means to obtain a more secure and prosperous life. There
tends to be a connection between human rights and democratic regimes. Jack Donnelly,
the UN and the Canadian government have all illustrated this relationship.

In fact,

Donnelly notes that human rights are better respected in democracies.5 The UN General

2 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, vol
2(3) (April 1970): 354
J Ghia Nodia, “How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?” in Democracy after Communism, eds.
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 3
4 Ibid, 3
5 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol 21(3)
(1999): 619

9
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Assembly’s Resolution 55/96 on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, recognizes an
“indissoluble link” between human rights and a democratic society.6 Similarly, CIDA
argues that three matrixes of democracy, human rights and good governance all elicit
development and security.7 Rights & Democracy also acknowledges this relationship,
including the idea o f poverty eradication.8 Empirically, Stephen Kosack finds this to be
true under one condition: in order for aid to work, democracy is a prerequisite.9
Democracy, then, is seen as part of a larger relationship within this sphere of human
rights, good governance and human development.
It is argued that the benefits of democratization are great.

Takashi Inoguchi,

Edward Newman and John Keene contend that a democracy aids in the furthering of
one’s self-interests within society.10 In the same way, CIDA recognizes democratization
as a vehicle to achieve sustainable development and a reduction in poverty, while
promoting “a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.”11 This is evidenced in a
recent report on the threats to democracy where it is argued that democratic states are
considerably more participatory in the global economy.12 In fact, a number of different
regional and international organizations now require democratic credentials for their
members, including the OAS and the EU.

6 United Nations. Resolution 55/96 Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, [online]; available from
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/55unga promotion democ.pdf.
7 CIDA, Government o f Canada Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and G ood
Governance, (Hull: CIDA), 3
8 Rights & Democracy, Subm ission...Strengthening A id Effectiveness: New Approaches to C anada’s
International Assistance Program, (Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 2001): 6
9 Stephen Kosack, “Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the Quality o f
Life,” World Development, vol 31(1): 14
10 Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman and John Keane, The Changing Nature o f Democracy, (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 1998), 1
11 CIDA, Government o f Canada Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and G ood
Governance, 3
Madeleine K. Albright, Bronislaw Germek, Morton Halperin, et al., Threats to Democracy: Prevention
and Response, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc, 2003), 9
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Alternatively, there are arguments that a certain degree of economic wealth and
development have to be instituted in a nation prior to democratization efforts. In fact, as
late as 1993, Huntington had argued that authoritarian governments are better able to
develop economic liberalization policies which are conducive to economic growth and
prosperity. 13 Moreover, he has also argued that in the spirit of Seymour Martin Upset’s
theories, the economic growth generated under alternative systems of government will
indeed reduce economic inequalities and help nations move towards more stable
democratic futures.14 Crawford, Burnell and Przeworski, however, contend otherwise.
There has been a great deal of research conducted in this area and it has often
produced contradictory results.

According to Crawford, the previous conventional

wisdom was replaced by the view that democracy was, indeed, able to sustain economic
reform.15 In fact, Adam Przeworski and colleagues have empirical evidence to offer,
finding the benefits of allocating investments under a democratic regime.16 In addition,
while it has been noted that significant economic growth has been sustained by the Asian
Tiger nations, which were at the time authoritarian in nature, many similar regimes have
also faced “economic ruin”, including the Congo and Uganda.17 Overall, the literature
does indicate a positive effect of democracy on economic development.

More

importantly, however, a more liberal and free nation, which is the essence of a

1’ Samuel P. Huntington, “What Cost Freedom?: Democracy and/or Economic Reform,” H arvard
International Review, vol xv, no 2 (Winter 1993): 12
14 Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future o f the Third Wave,” Journal o f Democracy, vol
8(4) (1997): 5
15 Gordon Crawford, Foreign A id and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis o f Democracy Assistance
and Political Conditionality, 13
16 Adam Przeworski, et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal o f Democracy, vol 7(1) (1996):
40
17 Sakiko Fukudo-Parr, Ngaire Woods, and Nancy Birdsall, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 58

11
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democracy, has one certainty and that is the promotion of social development and
stability.
The fundamental nature of democracies allows people to contribute to the
decision-making processes, making the politicians more responsive to their needs.
Through this, democratic governance is seen as a means to advance human development.
According to the Human Development Report of 2002, this is achieved through three
main aspects:

Firstly, democracies are better able to produce political stability.18

Political stability is ensured by the promotion of non-violent competitions and the process
of reconciliation of differences, according to USAID.19 Secondly, democracies are also
better able to avoid catastrophes, such as famines.20 This is partly attributable to a free
press and the fear of reelection and accountability. In fact, Amartya Sen has argued that a
democracy and free press are essential components to ensuring that substantial famines
do not occur.

2

1

*

•

Finally, there is more open discourse and exchanges of ideas.

22

Not only

are the best interests of citizens articulated, but the government also finds themselves
lobbied by a variety of organizations and associations. The benefits of democratization
are also seen in the principles of the democratic peace theory.
In fact, Carothers observes that under Presidents Bush and Clinton, the promotion
of democracy was both moral and practical in nature, with the assumption that
democratic nations “do not go to war with one another, produce refugees, or engage in

18 Sakiko Fukudo-Parr, Ngaire Woods, and Nancy Birdsall, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World, 51
19 USAID, Democracy and Governance, (Washington: USAID, 1991), 7
20 Sakiko Fukudo-Parr, Ngaire Woods, and Nancy Birdsall, Human Development Report 2002, 57
21 Amartya Sen, “Freedoms and Needs,” New Republic (January 10 and 17, 1994): 34
22 Sakiko Fukudo-Parr, Ngaire Woods, and Nancy Birdsall, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World, 58

12

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

terrorism.”

23

This is a powerful message, especially considering the events from 9/11

and the war in Iraq. Windsor contends that the values associated with a democracy,
including tolerance and compromise, aid in countering extremist actions.24 International
IDEA recognizes the larger aspect of democratization, with the sustaining of peace as an
ultimate goal.

25

Alternatively, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder note the possibility of

short term ethno-nationalistic movements or internal, democratic wars.26 In fact, they use
the examples of the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya to reinforce the potential negative
consequence of democratization and their resultant nationalist propaganda and
mobilization.

Part of this is attributable to the zero-sum effect of elections and the

introduction of new actors in the political arena. More so, however, this is attributable to
the lack of knowledge and experience associated with a democracy. The answer, then, is
to encourage reforms and encourage democratic development, through aid and other
programs. It becomes quite clear that democracy, in the long-run, is the only alternative
for economic, human and social development.
Finally, the Canadian perspective does not paint quite as clear a picture. While
there are numerous benefits associated with democratization, it is disturbing that CIDA
does not emphasize them in their relationships.

Despite this, some documents have

shown that Canada has a responsibility to help nations democratize. In Our Commitment
to Sustainable Development, CIDA recognizes that political sustainability is an important

2j Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 5
24 Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly,
vol 26(3) (2003): 47
25 International IDEA, The United Nations and Democracy: Towards Sustainable Peace-Building, (New
York: IDEA, 2002): 6
26 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs, vol 74(3) (1995).
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role in a nation’s development, especially with respect to eliminating poverty.27 The link
between Canada and the developing world has also been mentioned in many documents,
including the Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good
Governance. In it, Canada pledges to “support those who strive to increase respect for
human rights and democracy and improve governance in their own societies.”

'JO

Given

all that Canada has to offer and the obvious need of the democratizing world, there is an
obligation to aid those countries in need.

One can only assume that Canadian

involvement is larger than the stated reasons of eliminating poverty and increasing
development. It is hoped that CIDA envisions the humanitarian and social development
that is associated with truly consolidated democratic institutions. While the next section
describes the political and theoretical background of the term democracy, it also
examines the interrelationship and linkages between democracy and poverty or
sustainable development, showing how CIDA conceptualizes these issues.
What Does a Democracy Mean to CIDA?
Development and democracy have been linked throughout much of the literature
in this area of study, yet the precise meaning of the term is quite contested. It has been
argued by Crawford that, indeed, there is no one clear definition of democracy among
donors, with only agreement on the concepts of free and fair elections and multi-party
systems.29 This, however, is only a procedural examination of the term.

A more

27 CIDA, Our Commitment to Sustainable Democracy, (Gatineau: CIDA, 1997), [online]; available from
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
28 CIDA, Government o f Canada Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good
Governance. 2
29 Gordon Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance through Development
Aid, ix
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consolidated view contains the important dimensions that make promoting democracy a
worthwhile initiative. It is the consolidated view that CIDA should be encouraging.
Joseph A. Schumpeter’s classic theory of democracy in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy, provides the basis of procedural democracy. This test of a democracy takes
into consideration the ability of citizens to choose their representatives who in return,
carry out the will of the people.30 Under this procedural definition, elections are at the
core of a democratic system, providing a very minimalist understanding of the term.
Przeworski and colleagues have taken this a step further in their definitional explanation
of the term, adding that the opposition groups should have a chance of winning the
election.31 This is similar to Huntington’s critic of those superficial democracies where
turnovers do not exist.32 Yet, it is obvious that such definitions are not substantive
enough to capture the true meaning of a complete democracy and, hence, scholars have
built upon these existing definitions.
Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer argue that there are four main components to a
“complete democracy.” It has rule of law, an active civil society that is independent from
the state, fair and free elections, and accountable officials.

33

This “complete democracy”

reflects the enhanced concept of a liberal democracy. This, in fact, is similar to Collier
and Levitsky’s categorization34 and is the core of Larry Diamond’s theory of a liberal
democracy. He adds to these components the ability of citizens to express their interests,
30 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed., (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1950), 269
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World
1950-1990, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 16
32 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 305-306
” Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding
the Post-Communist Societies, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 36
34 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative
Research,” World Politics, vol 49 (April 1997): 434
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practice their cultures, join movements and

p a r tic ip a te

in elections. ~ Independent media
!/■

and basic freedoms like the freedom of speech or assembly are also stressed.

Freedom

from torture, detention and terror are important elements, as w e ll/7 It is critical to note
here that the very process of democratization does not take a “one-size fits all” approach.
Instead, there is a need to address the needs and desires of the nations in question,
adapting these terms to individual circumstances. In the Policy fo r CIDA on Human
Rights, Democratization, and Good Governance, this in fact is a part of the main
TO

objective.
CIDA’s definition of democratization embodies the liberal version, proposed by
Diamond. Specifically, CIDA defines democratization as the “strengthening [of] popular
participation in the exercise of power, building democratic institutions and practices, and
deepening democratic values.”39 This is rather vague and generalized, but it does go on
to include both formal and informal participation by citizens in the political affairs of the
state, and the necessity to include a federal system with a judiciary.40 The organization
uses respect of democratic rights as a measure of the system and this includes the right to
vote, the right to be a part of elections and freedom of “opinion, expression and
association.”41 Moreover, an independent media and judicial system with civil society

■'5 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 11
36 Ibid, 11
” Ibid, 12
>s CIDA, Government o f Canada Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and G ood
Governance, 4
39 Ibid, 21

40 Ibid, 21
41 Ibid, 21
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and an institutionalized understanding and acceptance of the system are all demarcated as
a “strong democratic society”.42
Diamond’s and CIDA’s categorization, however, are quite in-depth and
consequently, many developing nations have difficulties in attaining these standards. In
1996, Diamond argued that the movement towards more consolidated forms of liberal
democracy had stagnated with more nations turning towards “pseudo-democratic” forms
of democratization.43 Consequently, there has been growing literature in this area of
precisely what constitutes these states.
democracies,

proto-democracies,

These states are often categorized as semi

pseudo-democracies,

or

frail,

restricted,

or

unconsolidated democracies. The categorization is indeed quite messy. While many
terms have been given to those democracies which are limited in nature, they each share a
number of traits.

According to Georg Sorensen, restricted democracies have some

democratic elements, but they fail to fulfill their obligations in areas such as competition,
participation and liberties.44 A good example is the role of the military in nations such as
Brazil during their transitional period. Pinochet’s role in restricting democratization in
Chile also shows the power of driven elites in slowing down the pace of reform.45
Interestingly, pseudo-democracies are still considered authoritarian in nature. The extent
of their democratic values varies from situation to situation. Overall, they do tend to
have higher levels of freedom than authoritarian regimes and they seem to tolerate a
degree of pluralism and dissidence with often viable alternatives to the ruling party in

42 CIDA, Government o f Canada Policy fo r CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and G ood
Governance, 21
4> Larry Diamond, “Is The Third Wave Over?” Journal o f Democracy, vol 7(3) (1996): 30
44 Georg Sorenssen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, 2nd
ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 46
45 Ibid, 47
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question.46 Common examples include Mexico, Russia, and many of the developing
African nations. Some scholars have argued that gradually introducing reforms is the
best way to ensure long-standing, self-sustaining democracies. This, however, entails the
continuing existence of such pseudo-democracies.
In fact, in a study by Catharin Dalpino, it is suggested that developed nations
promote “openness” and “liberalization.” She defines this as a slow progression towards
democracy.47

Such a shift in policy would contribute to the liberal notion of

democratization, instead of the electoral or procedural definition. This is the type of
programming that one would expect Canada to engage in with China. Over time, it is
suggested that true democracies will emerge. Yong-Chuan Liu correspondingly finds
that new democracies have a better chance of succeeding if they gradually introduce
reform, emphasizing the dependence on social pre-requisites, political and civil rights.48
From this, one can see that democratization is a lengthy process that embodies a number
of different phases.

It is not a dichotomy, but instead a linear process, akin to the

explanation of the Freedom House index. On a scale of 1 to 7, under this rationale, a
democratic state would encompass the 1 to 2.5, while a “partly free” state is comparable
to the pseudo-democracies previously discussed. They would encompass 3 to 5.5 on the
scale. Finally, from 5.5 to 7, are the “non-free” nations like China or Iraq where Canada
would focus on the Dalpino method of programming. The nation would not directly
promote free elections or pluralism in these nations.

46 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 16
47 Catharin E. Dalpino, Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in Authoritarian Regimes,
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 3
48 Yong-Chuan Liu, Patterns and Results o f the Third Democratization Wave, (Lanham: University Press
o f America, Inc., 1993), 107
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From the literature of CIDA, it is disturbing to note the limited nature that
democracy and democratization plays in official documents.

While it is true that

according to some CIDA documents, aid recipient selection is related to a commitment to
democracy, good governance and human rights,49 Rights & Democracy criticizes the
nature of Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, arguing that the actual organizing concept of
the paper deals with only good governance.50 Moreover, their criterion is argued to be
“narrow, limited and shortsighted.”51 Consequently, it is difficult to gage the actual
importance that CIDA does place on democratization within the development
perspective, with only individual country reports and ministers briefly stating the current
relationship between the two variables. This, essentially, makes one question how CIDA
targets individual nations with appropriate democratic aid, when there is no overarching
relationships or official documentation of how they approach each individual
circumstance. This illustrates that there is a more uniform approach considered with
democratic aid.
Indeed, this can be very problematic.

Based on the work by Valerie Bunce,

Michael McFaul, Jacques Rupnik and Huntington, it is obvious that there are multiple
potential outcomes, processes and possibilities for democratization.52 In fact, Carothers
illustrates this nicely in his article “the End of the Transition Paradigm”. He argues that

49 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening A id
Effectiveness, (Hull: CIDA, 2002), 26
50 Rights & Democracy, Submission... Strengthening A id Effectiveness: New Approaches to C anada’s
International Assistance Program, 4
51 Ibid, 4
52 Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,”
World Politics, vol 55(2) (2003): 177, Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave o f Democracy and
Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics, vol 54(2) (2002):
234, Jacques Rupnik, “The Postcommunist Divide,” in Democracy after Communism, eds. Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 104, Samuel P. Huntington,
The Third Wave, 290
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there is a need to classify the pseudo-democracies to better reflect the system in question.
Based on his research, he had found that there were nearly 100 transitional nations, but
only a small number of them were moving positively towards the direction of a true or
liberal democracy.53 It is only by examining the root of the stagnation that a donor
country is able to target the necessary approach to increase democratization in the
recipient nation, using the examples of feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics to
illustrate his findings.54
In sum, an examination of the concept of democracy yields a number of different
results. Firstly, within the CIDA context, the organization fails to adequately discuss the
rationale behind democratic aid. From some of the documents, democracy is seen as way
to induce development and security, yet it is very vague and generalized. This is despite
the abundance of literature in this area. Secondly, it is troubling that there is no clear
definition of what constitutes democracy or democratic levels in the various nations.
While CIDA’s document on Human Rights, Democratization, and Good Governance,
illustrates a more liberal theory of democracy, it does not deal with any other categorizes,
including authoritarianism or pseudo-democracies. It is essential that the agency stress
more specifically how they deal with these issues, as the degree of democratization
should play an important role in the programming for the recipient nation.
From this examination of democracy, the definition of CIDA becomes clearer.
CIDA is the main organization that is responsible for democratic aid in Canada, yet it has
an ambiguous approach to the definition of the term.

From the introduction, the

organization is responsible for development in the following areas: economic, social,

5’ Thomas Carothers, “The End o f Transition Paradigm,” Journal o f Democracy, vol 13(1) (2002): 9
54 Ibid, 10-12
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environment and governance. Its attention, then, is split across multiple disciplines and
programmes. CIDA, however, is not organized accordingly. Instead, the branches are
organized according to geographic branches, multilateral programming, policy branch,
performance

and

knowledge

management,

Canadian

partnership,

information

management and technology, and Canada corps. Each of these deals with some aspect of
democratization, yet no branch or sub-branch really owns this area, creating a complex
environment that makes programming more difficult.
There is relatively little literature review on CIDA, with the majority negative in
nature. The work by Greenhill is a comprehensive examination of Canada’s international
impact with respect to foreign policy, using the external views of those within the
industry. His study finds that Canada’s reputation in foreign affairs has deteriorated over
the years.35 In fact, those who were interviewed recognize that Canada is capable of
initiating successful policy initiatives, but there is an apprehension that “successes are
sporadic and disjointed.”56 He finds faults within CIDA, such as the number of ministers
within the department since 1989.

He argues that the brevity of their stays lead to

decreased focus and changing priorities with “slow, erratic decision making” and an
exceedingly bureaucratic structure.57 While he is convincing in his arguments, Greenhill
does not give specific examples or case studies to make the case stronger. In addition, he
does not explain how he has come to these findings.

Danielle Goldfarb’s study is

essential to this argument, as well. After examining CIDA recipient’s grants, she finds
that 10 out of the 25 top aid recipients for 1994 to 1999 “had negative annual per capita

55 Robert Greenhill, M aking a Difference? External Views on C anada’s International Impact, 1
56 Ibid, 15
57 Ibid, 15
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growth rates over that period.”58 More importantly, though, Bangladesh received the
most aid in the fiscal years of 1998-99 and 1999-00, yet was ranked the highest on
corruption levels.59 This is quite disturbing, as she argues that corruption can reduce the
effectiveness of aid.60 From these two arguments, CIDA is portrayed as a bureaucratic
organization that has been less than successful with its objectives. The agency does not
distribute aid in a meaningful way, donating the most aid to those recipient nations that
have most decaying growth and high levels of corruption.

While these studies are

important to understanding the organizational structure and capacity of CIDA, they do
not emphasize the effectiveness of democracy promotion strategies within it. Greenhill
and Goldfarb deal with the organization in its entirety and individual results may in fact
yield a different outcome.
In a study examining the humanitarian programmes at CIDA, Margie BuchananSmith and Natalie Folster find that the organization relies heavily on NGOs, development
partners or UN agencies to deliver humanitarian programs and relief,61 affecting their
ability to enforce and measure effectiveness.

Consequently, their programmes, to a

certain degree, become shaped by the different agencies that are willing to operate in the
fields and provide the services. It is no surprise, then, that Rondinelli’s study uncovers
reports stating that CIDA would need to improve accountability and service delivery. 62
CIDA, itself, recognizes the need to develop better ties across different policy areas,

58 Danielle Goldfarb, “Who Gets CIDA Grants? Recipient Corruption and the Effectiveness o f
Development Aid,” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder, November 29, 2001: 1
59 Ibid, 7
60 Ibid, 6
61 Margie Smith-Buchanan and Natalie Folster, C anada’s International Humanitarian Assistance
Programme: Policy Oversight Mechanisms, (Overseas Development Institute, 2002): 1
62 Dennis A. Rondinelli, “Strategic Management in Foreign Aid Agencies: Developing a Results-based
Performance System,” International Review o f Administrative Sciences, vol 60 (1994): 466
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increasing the levels of horizontal coordination among different departments.63 Again,
there is evidence proving the weaknesses in the institution, yet the direct impact of this is
not examined with respect to democracy promotion. While not the focus of his work,
Brian Tomlinson deals briefly with this issue.
According to Tomlinson, CIDA “did not set out a comprehensive policy for
human rights, democratization and good governance until 1995.”64 This may account for
the lack o f literature on the area of effectiveness on democracy projects.

More

specifically, Tomlinson argues that since 1995, spending that had been listed as
democracy aid and governance has actually been spent in other areas like government
capacity and services.65 In Morrison’s Aid and Ebb Tide, a historical examination of
CIDA provides a similar picture.

Throughout his work, there is little mention of the

trinity o f human rights, democracy and good governance, emphasizing the limited nature
of study in this area, especially within the CIDA context. From these authors, CIDA can
be defined as well-intentioned institution that suffers from a number of departmental
deficiencies. It is an organization that has been criticized in the past for its bureaucratic
structure, accountability and funding decisions. The extent to which this is true with their
democracy promotion strategies has not been studied and this is where this thesis
attempts to fill a void in the literature.
Diane Ethier, Gerald Schmitz and Rachad Antonius have all studied the role of
Canada in promoting democracy abroad. Ethier’s study examines CIDA and democratic

fi' CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening A id
Effectiveness, 17
64 Brian Tomlinson, “Tracking Change in Canadian ODA: New Directions for Poverty Reduction?
Canadian NGO Reflections,” International Journal, vol 56(1) (Winter 2000/01), online, available from
http://webvoy.uwindsor.ca:2048/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=37472083 l&sid=l&Fmt=
3&clinetid=2241&RQT=309&VName=POD.
65 Ibid, 5
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development projects between 1994 and 2000. While recognizing that these projects
attempted to consolidate democratic institutions and increase the respect of human rights,
there was no actual overall evaluation of their impacts 66 Looking at the Freedom House
data suggested that 6 out of the 8 countries in which CIDA had aid programmes had
increased their levels of political liberties.67 Despite this, Ethier notes that it is not
possible to determine a casual relationship.

ZQ

She also does not specifically examine the

levels of funding or how the projects were conducted.

Schmitz’s examination of

Canadian democracy promotion, on the other hand, questions the levels of effectiveness
of the various activities of Canadian organizations.

The International Development

Research Centre (IDRC), CIDA, Elections Canada, the Canadian Human Rights
Commission, NGOs and universities all have done their part to promote democratization
abroad.

Unfortunately, he argues that these activities were not “coherent.”69

Unfortunately, Schmitz does not indicate the reasons why. Discussants at a roundtable
on Canadian democratic policies similarly found a problem with coherence in Canadian
foreign affairs.70 Despite this, Antonius argues that there was considerable cooperation
between the different democracy promoting agencies in Canada, specifically DFAIT,
CIDA and IDRC during think-tank sessions.71 In effect, he finds cross-departmental
cooperation. These authors also provide a vital look at the organization, especially across
departments with Ethier’s work specifically examining the role of democracy projects.
66 Diane Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives,”
Democratization, vol 10(1) (Spring 2003): 110
67 Ibid, 110
68 Ibid, 110
69 Gerald J. Schmitz, “The Role o f International Democracy Promotion in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” IRPP
Policy Matters, vol 5(10) (2004): 14
70 Rachad Antonius, Democratic Development in the Middle East and North Africa: A Report Based on
F ield Research and Consultations, September 1, 2001-March 31, 2002, (Montral: Rights and Democracy,
2002), 53
7'ibid, 3
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Yet, missing from the literature is the important question of CIDA’s intra-departmental
effectiveness with respect to democracy promotion.

Effectiveness should not be

measured solely as increasing or decreasing the Freedom House level of a nation, as
Ethier’s study did, but instead it should look at the institution as a whole. In this case,
effectiveness should be a more complex measure, including: the way aid is distributed,
the programmes that are funded, and the organization’s ability to administer assistance
and evaluate projects. This is critical, as it is only through evaluation that an organization
is able to recognize its weaknesses and address them with solutions.
There have been many studies conducted throughout the years that have
addressed this issue of effectiveness. In fact, Paul Collier’s study on “making aid smart”
finds that it is imperative to focus programmes, citing the failures of the Dutch aid
programme which financed over 80 nations.72 When the programme cut aid to only 17
•

low-income nations, the effectiveness of the aid increased.

73

•

•

•

With respect to foreign aid

on aggregate levels, CIDA finds that Canadian aid is among the least concentrated of all
DAC nations.74 With the top 15 recipient nations receiving approximately 25% of total
ODA of donor nations, the Canadian average was only 15.8% in 1999-2000.75 While
CIDA has made some steps towards “enhanced partnerships” the degree and success of
this initiative is yet to be studied.76 Moreover, there fails to exist a comprehensive
examination of democracy promoting programmes alone. Instead, an over-reliance on
ODA numbers exists and this may alter the actual impact of democracy projects. Despite

72 Paul Collier, Making A id Smart: Institutional Incentives Facing Donor Organizations and their
Implications fo r A id Effectiveness, (College Park: Centre for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector,
2002), 3
73 Ibid, 3
74 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World\ 9
75 Ibid, 9
76 Ibid, 11
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this, on a larger level, Collier finds that there are issues with aid effectiveness and
changes should be made.77 In another study with David Dollar, Collier finds that there is
a sense o f optimism in the case of aid effectiveness, but this optimism should be coupled
•

•

♦

with the need to examine the failures of aid more specifically.

78

The effectiveness of democracy aid has garnered much attention in the last few
years. Much of the writing is negative on the topic with the recognition of the inherent
difficulties of measuring effectiveness. This was certainly the case of USAID and US
democracy promoting strategies. David Forsythe and Barbara Ann Reiffer argue that it is
difficult to chart the impact and success of democracy promotion.

79

This is attributable to

the number of people and countries involved. Consequently, they argue that there have
been “few independent studies of effect or impact”.80 With their qualitative examination
of overall US democracy promotion, they find that the impact of their programmes is
minimal, partly because of the lack of funding and the lack of recipient concentration.81
Moreover, they argue that too much attention is paid to more strategic and economic selfO ')

interests within the nation’s democracy-promoting strategies.

Thomas Carothers’

examination of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) yields similar results. In
another study based largely on qualitative methods, he finds that there was no agreement
over the effectiveness and work of the NED.

OT

Overall, the result was positive, yet

Carothers also recognizes that the NED does not keep in mind the complex histories of
77 Paul Collier, M aking A id Smart: Institutional Incentives Facing Donor Organizations and their
Implications fo r A id Effectiveness, 21
78 Paul Collier and David Dollar, “Development Effectiveness: What Have We Learnt?” The Economic
Journal, vol 114 (June 2004): F244
79 David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer, “US Foreign Policy and Enlarging the Democratic
Community,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol 22(4) (2000): 988
80 Ibid, 1000
81 Ibid, 1007
82 Ibid, 1007
83 Thomas Carothers, “The NED at 10,” Foreign Policy, no 95 (Summer 1994): 124
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specific nations and sometimes, there may be inadvertent consequences on certain groups
within the population.84 The endowment, however, may be a valuable alternative to the
basic bilateral agreements, as Carothers would argue that they move faster than USAID
and other government agencies.85 In another article, Carothers finds that there is a lack of
cooperation between the state agencies and officials of USAID.

There is also the sense

that democracy promotion strategies simply deal with the symptoms instead of the causes
of a nation’s democracy deficiency.

87

Carothers also mentions, in one of his studies, that both US and Western
democracy assistance are “superficial and too generic”.88 Despite this, he also recognizes
*

•

that improvements have been made, especially at the electoral assistance level with more
»
*
89
local initiatives being supported with more comprehensive
and long term strategies.

Stephen Golub’s study, however, is more critical of the US democracy aid programs. He
finds that the work conducted in the Philippines on judicial programming “achieved very
little.”90 Like Carothers, he attributes this to certain foreign funded organizations that do
not target the underlying problems in these nations, like corruption, patronage and
indifference.91 The question, then, is not one of technical deficiencies and training, but of
overall deep-rooted political and judicial cultures. 92

When one measures the

84 Thomas Carothers, “The NED at 10,” 135
85 Ibid, 136
86 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy, State and AID: A Tale o f Two Cultures,” Foreign Service Journal
(February 2001); [journal online]; accessed July 5, 2004; available from
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications?FSarticle.asp?p=l
87 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question o f Strategy,” Democratization, vol 4(3)
(Autumn 1997): 122
88 Ibid, 130
89 Ibid, 130
90 Stephen J. Golub, “Democracy as Development: A Case for Civil Society Assistance in Asia,” in
Funding Virtue: Civil Society A id and Democracy Promotion, eds. Marina Ottaway and Thomas
Carothers, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 147
91 Ibid, 147
92 Ibid, 147
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effectiveness of these programs, it becomes imperative to include such distinct issues.
Oftentimes, especially within the Canadian studies, they are omitted.
In their examination of political conditionality and commitments to democracy,
Moore and Robinson contend that for the sake of clarity and simplicity, it may be better
to focus on the aspect of human rights, specifically civil and political rights.

More

importantly, however, in their study, they recognize that aid recipients are known to agree
to certain obligations and agreements, knowing that the donors are unable to monitor
them.94 From this, one can assume that the degree of the effectiveness of democracy aid
is dependent on the monitoring methods used. Often, however, these methods are
inadequate, due to the issues of cost, labour and environmental conditions. Despite this,
there have been plenty of examinations of democracy promotion strategies, using specific
case examples or general overviews.

A large amount of work has been done by

Carothers, Carlos Santiso and Marina Ottaway, all yielding negative results.
In Carothers’ Aiding Democracy Abroad, a thorough examination of democracy
aid with specific examples and case studies, it is argued that it is necessary to examine
indigenous interests in the nation.95 He contends that this could help along the processes
of change and create a society better able to adapt to the trials of democratization.96
Moreover, it is essential to take into account the local context and design programmes
that provide more options and understanding for local government officials with
cooperation between new alliances and stakeholders.97 Optimistic about the effectiveness

93 Mick Moore and Mark Robinson, “Can Foreign Aid Be Used to Promote Good Government in
Developing Countries?” Ethics and International Affairs, vol 8(1994): 155
94 Ibid, 144
95 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 107
96 Ibid, 107
97 Ibid, 107-108
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of aid, he also recognizes that there are many shortcomings in this area.98 Similarly,
Santiso argues that democratization is not easy and not always possible to achieve.99 His
study o f the democracy assistance policies of the international community and how those
policies have succeeded or failed concludes that the strategies employed did not live up to
expectations.100 This is equally true when democratization policies are coupled with
political conditionalities.

In a study of 29 cases of donors exerting aid sanctions on

recipient nations, Crawford found that only 13 of the 29 nations showed a “progressive
trend” towards democratization.101 Moreover, a closer examination revealed that only 9
out of those 13 cases were partially attributable to donor pressures.

102

Similar to Moore

and Robinson, Crawford found that countries are able to resist the negative impact of
donor restrictive measures and their punitive natures, partly because of the category of
the measures and the strength of the recipient nations.103 In essence, the recipient feels
that there is very little a donor nation can do to punish them for their undemocratic
behaviour. The cases of China, Nigeria and Turkey also indicate that the elements of
human rights and democratic principles are not of primary concern to the donor
nations.104 There is, then, a conflicting message being sent to developing countries. A
similarly focused study on the nature of democratic development and Canadian
democratic aid would be useful. In most cases, these aggregate studies of democracy aid
or foreign aid, more generally, fail to adequately provide specific examples of their

98 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 11
99 Carlos Santiso, “International Cooperation for Democracy and Good Governance: Moving Toward a
Second Generation,” European Journal o f Development Research, vol 13(1) (June 2001): 7
100 Ibid, 4
101 Gordon Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditonality: Issues o f Effectiveness and Consistency,”
Democratization, vol 4(3) (Autumn 1997): 73
102 Ibid, 73
103 Ibid, 81
104 Ibid, 101-103
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failures and/or successes. The previous studies are also quite negative overall in their
findings, yet surely there exists some positive aspects of the effectiveness of democracy
aid.

A more balanced examination would prove worthwhile to this area of study,

illustrating successful strategies that could be replicated by donor nations. Carothers’
Romanian and Serbian are good examples.
For Carothers’ Romanian study, he interviewed 150 people with a wide mix of
individuals with knowledge of the US programme. He included members of parliament,
judges, students, local government officials and businessmen. The study evaluates the
impact of projects, years after their completion. It also assesses the whole nature of the
programmes, examining both the intended and unintended consequences of them. His
study finds that democracy programmes in Romania were wrought with problems.
Romanians felt that the assistance was inadequate, arguing that many of the visiting
experts did not know enough about the country and their training programmes.105 Often,
as the case of the judicial reform programmes showed, it was difficult to be effective
because of the variety and complexity of the problems.

The knowledge that the US

programmes presented were not sufficient to deal with the structural flaws of low
salaries, weak political will and political interference.106

Moreover, much of the

assistance often goes to US agencies and organizations, instead of indigenous NGOs that
might be able to better serve the community.107

This also means that once the

105 Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy>Assistance: The Case o f Romania, (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1996), 41
106 Ibid, 55
107 Ibid, 93

30

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

programmes end, there is no one to continue the work.108 Interestingly, Carothers’ work
on Serbia proves to be more positive in nature.
In an examination of western aid to opposition parties, civil advocacy sectors,
independent media and opposition-controlled municipalities, Carothers found the
outcome to be quite encouraging. While it was difficult to say if aid determined the
political outcome, he was confident that the democratic campaign was well done.109 The
reasons for the success were attributed to a number of factors, including a large, sustained
aid effort, with assistance going to smaller local groups throughout the nations.110 There
was also a common goal among US and European workers with better aid
coordination.111 Marina Ottaway also argues that more realistic policy needs to be
developed to address specific problems. 1 12 Examining Africa as a case example, she
finds that programmes need to be kept simple, avoiding social engineering. 113 Moreover,
there is a need to “concentrate development assistance” and political reform in those
countries that have a more competent and stable government.114 This is to ensure that the
aid is more likely to have a positive effect and act as an example to other nations.115
These cases are excellent indicators of the difficulties and successes attributable to aid
donors. Unfortunately, they do not examine the Canadian perspective. The extent to
which these results are replicable in Canadian democracy promotion strategies must be
examined and this is what this thesis has set out to do.
108 Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case o f Romania, 108
109 Thomas Carothers, “Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia,” Carnegies Endowment Policy
Brief, vol 1(5) (May 2001): 5
110 Ibid, 6
111 Ibid, 6-7
112 Marina Ottaway, “Less is Better: An Agenda for Africa,” Carnegie Endowment Policy B rief vol 1(2)
(Dec 2000): 1
113 ibid, 6
114 Ibid, 6
"5 Ibid, 6
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In addition to these generalized findings on democracy promotion, Marina
Ottaway and Theresa Chung reflect ort the overarching mistake of aid donors, mainly the
sustainability of the programmes that they encourage. Generalizing their findings, they
argue that most democracy aid programs do not consider the long term impacts and
sustainability.116 The areas of electoral aid, aid to political parties and civil society
encouragement are too expensive for the nations to sustain after the withdrawal of aid.117
Instead, a more “bottom-up approach” is needed.118 Elizabeth Spiro Clark, however,
contends that Ottaway and Chung call for a “paradigm shift” that is excessive.

She

agrees that emerging democracies are having problems financing their newly
democratizing state and elections and, consequently, there is a need for more assistance
without premature withdrawal.119 Irene Lasota, on the other hand, has a more positive
outlook for Western democracy aid in post-communist European and former USSR
states. In response to Ottaway and Chung, Lasota argues that more local involvement is
needed.

Self-sustaining programming is possible with more local initiatives.120

Interestingly, she contends that in some former communist states, the West did not play a
substantial role and that these states indicate that they would be able to survive on their
own.121 Lasota also indicates that elections need not always be expensive, as the case of
Georgia in 1989 proved.122 E. Gyimah-Boadi examines “the cost of doing nothing” in
response to these authors. He argues that while Ottaway and Chung make some valid

116 Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung, “Toward a New Paradigm,” Journal o/Democracy, vol 10(4)
(1999): 100
1,7 Ibid, 101
118 Ibid, 110.
119 Elizabeth Spiro Clark, “A Tune-Up, Not an Overhaul,” Journal o f Democracy, vol 10(4) (1999): 117
120 Irena Lasota, “Sometimes Less is More,” Journal o f Democracy, vol 10(4) (1999): 126
121 ibid, 127
[22 Ibid, 126
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points, they do not mention the alternatives of assistance.125 In fact, the benefits of
democratization far exceed the cost of sustaining non-democratic regimes and
consequently, it is necessary to fund any programme that can facilitate the change
towards it.124 In fact, while the costs of preliminary elections are high and justifiable,
Ottaway and Chung should look at the costs over time.125 If election costs remain high,
there is a definite problem. While Lasota’s idea on more local involvement is valid,
Gyimah-Boadi argues that incumbent regimes will typically not want to fund such civil
society programs, fearing that they will undermine their power.126 It is also very difficult
to engage the local community, as supporters are often impoverished with other
necessary duties.127 Ottaway and Chung, Spiro Clark, Lasota and Gyimah-Boadi all
examined question of cost and sustainability of democracy aid projects. They developed
the negative and positive aspects of aid, based on vast generalizations and country
specific examples.

There still remains the question of where Canada fits into these

generalizations. Such research questions the role that Canada should play in promoting
democracy abroad.
The major criticism with the studies on democracy promotion is the lack of
institutional perspective of the donor nation. Some have examined USAID briefly as an
organization, especially in the work of Carothers, but CIDA and its relationship with
democracy promotion is notably absent.

As stated previously, the question of

effectiveness, in this case, will be answered by examining the way in which aid is
distributed, the programmes that are funded, and the organization’s ability to administer
12j E. Gyimah-Boadi, “The Cost o f Doing Nothing,” Journal o f Democracy, vol 10(4) (1999): 119
124 Ibid, 119
125 Ibid, 120
126 Ibid, 120-121
127 Ibid, 121
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assistance and evaluate projects. This requires a more thorough investigation of CIDA as
an institution. Consequently, based on the previous literature review on CIDA and the
more generalized democracy promotion, it is hypothesized that Canadian programmes are
not being adequately measured, as a result of the difficulties of evaluating democratic aid
projects and the institutional failures of CIDA. Additionally, the organization’s ability to
administer assistance is faulty, and hence, its policies are not conducive to meaningful
and effective programming. Moreover, it is hypothesized that the organization greatly
disperses democratic aid, using the work of Goldfarb as a basis for this statement.
While the hypothesis deals with the funding of programmes and the
organizational constraints of CIDA, the second hypothesis explores how aid is distributed
to recipient nations.

While the question of who gets democracy aid has not been

examined specifically in the literature, especially within the Canadian perspective, there
has been a plethora of studies done on developmental assistance.

More specifically,

David Morrison, B. Mak Arvin and Torben Drewes, Stephen Hoadley, and Ryan
Macdonald and John Hoddinott all explore Canadian aid in general.
In some of the literature, including Morrison’s Aid and Ebb Tide, Canadian
foreign aid has been described to be a result of a “trinity of mixed motives.” First
recognized by Keith Spicer, Morrison quotes member of Parliament J.M. Macdonnell in
1961, recognizing the humanitarian, political and commercial rational for aid. "

Arvin

and Drewes, however, would disagree with this trinity. In an extensive study of the
CIDA Annual Reports for 1982-1992, Arvin and Drewes find that aid is not tied to

128 David R. Morrison, A id and Ebb Tide: A History o f CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance,
(Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1998), 13
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strategic commercial interests.129 Similarly, in Hoadley’s examination of the aid policy
characteristics of small and large state donors, small states tend to give aid with less selfinterest in mind.130 As a small state donor, Canada gives aid to fewer recipients more
131

generously. ‘ Interestingly, his study finds that casual relationships cannot be made
between a state’s size and behaviour.132 On the other hand, Macdonald and Hoddinott’s
study on Canadian bilateral aid from 1984 to 2000 resists this finding. Attempting to see
if allocations were based on humanitarian, commercial or political aspects, the
researchers contend that aid flows increasingly reflect commercial concerns, becoming
less altruistic with time.

While, these studies all examined foreign aid in its entirety,

missing from the literature are specific rationales for Canadian democratic aid. From
this, however, it is still obvious that there are many factors involved with the dispersal of
assistance. Yet, the studies still lack a clear examination of who gets democratic aid and
why. Peter Burnell has filled that void, by examining multiple nations. According to
Burnell, democratization is encouraged for a multitude of reasons, including national and
international

security,

the

need

for world

stability,

trade

and

commerce.134

Democratization levels also play an important role, according to some researchers.
Eric Neumayer’s quantitative study on bilateral aid allocations of 21 donor
nations argues that nations with good civil and political rights records were given more
aid preference with the exception of Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland and Portugal as

129 B. Mak Arvin and Torben Drewes, “Biases in the Allocation o f Canadian Official Development
Assistance,” A pplied Economic Letters, vol 5 (1998): 11A
130 Stephen J. Hoadley, “Small States as Aid Donors,” International Organization, vol 34(1) (Winter,
1980): 137
131 Ibid, 136
132 Ibid, 137
133 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?” Canadian Journal o f Economics, vol 37(2) (May 2004): 296
134 Peter Burnell, “The Changing Politics o f Foreign Aid - Where to NextT ’Politics, vol 17(2) (1997): 120
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donor nations.135 With that said, when compared to previous studies, it is found that in
the case o f Canada and Denmark, personal integrity rights matter more than civil or
political rights in aid levels and donations.136 Considering that he used the Freedom
House index to measure civil and political rights, this means that Canadian aid is not
linked positively with levels of democratic development. Moreover, the study also finds
that former colonies were generally more likely to receive higher levels of aid.137
According to Morrison, Canada’s global reach makes Canada unique, as most colonial
powers concentrate their resources into their former colonies and most large and small
donors specialize their aid in certain regions or along ideological lines.138 This was
certainly the case in Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ariane Tichit’s study. Smaller donors
tend to allocate more aid to their trading partners, with greater emphasis on geographic
location.139 Their study covered 137 recipient nations and 22 donors, all members of the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD from 1980 to 1999. Their
results show the complexity of aid allocation. For example, they find that alliances and
historical-political ties play an important role in the allocation of aid for France, the UK,
Spain and Portugal.140 Overall, however, aid flows were significantly impacted by civil
liberty and political freedoms, as measured by the Freedom House Index.141 In essence, a
nation would receive more aid if it was considered more democratic. Unfortunately, it
did not isolate Canadian aid, only specifying that the US and Australia award more

135 Eric Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocations? A Quantitative Analysis o f 21
Donor Countries,” Social Science Quarterly, vol 84(3) (September 2003): 659
136 Ibid, 663
137 Ibid, 659
|j8 David R. Morrison, A id a nd Ebb Tide: A History o f CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, 17
139 Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ariane Tichit, Bilateral Donors ’ A id Allocation Decisions: A ThreeDimensional Panel Analysis, (Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. 2003), 17
140 Ibid, 6
141 Ibid, 11
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democratic nations with more money, while France and Belgium tend to give more aid to
non-democratic African nations.142
Macdonald and Houdinott’s study provides some very useful information
regarding recipient nations of Canadian aid. They find that countries categorized as “not
or partially free” received approximately 40% less aid than “fully free” nations.143
Hence, Canadian aid is dependent on the level of democracy in the recipient nation.
Unfortunately, Canadian aid, in this case, is measured in terms of all bilateral aid. It is
unknown if measuring solely democratic aid yields the same results. Macdonald and
Hoddinott’s findings are certainly not similar to Youngs’ study on the European Union’s
democracy aid strategies.

Youngs contends that while aid is supposedly based on

democratic progress, in practice, this is not the case.

Instead, countries that did not

progress democratically in Sub-Sahara were not punished144 and, in the case of Central
and Eastern European democracy aid, aid was not correlated to their democratic
progress.145 Interestingly, the study conducted by Macdonald and Hoddinott also finds
that La Francophonie and Commonwealth nations received more aid, depending on
income and population levels.146 Using the Freedom House index to measure a nation’s
human rights records, its results indicate that as a nation’s human rights record improved,
Canadian bilateral aid increased.147 In addition, there is also a relationship between aid
flows and exports. For example, as a nation increased their imports of Canadian goods,
142 Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ariane Tichit, Bilateral Donors ’Ai d Allocation Decisions: A ThreeDimensional Panel Analysis, 17
143 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?” 306
144 Richard Youngs, “European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On,” European Foreign
Affairs Review, vol 6 (2001): 357
145 Ibid, 359
146 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?” 306
147 Ibid, 307
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Canadian aid also increased.148 Their work determines that Canadian aid is indeed
complex, dependent on a variety of factors and relationships.
Despite the difficulties with measuring foreign aid, Alberto Alesina and David
Dollar examined the aid flow of the DAC with 5 year intervals beginning in 1970-74 to
1990-94. Their results show that a democratic country received 39% more aid, while a
nation with a colonial past received 87%.149 A democratizing country received a 50%
increase in aid after transition.150 The strongest response to democratization was from the
US, Denmark, UK, Nordic nations and Canada.151 Although, they do note that Egypt and
Israel received more aid than other nations with similar characteristics.

152

There were

some difficulties with this study, though, primarily the fact that the US, Japan, France and
1 CO

Germany made up the majority of aid and that may have skewed the aggregate results.
Moreover, the strength of the relationship of democratization and aid is questionable. For
example, they find that some of the largest increases and decreases in aid are followed by
increases to democratization.154 Stephen Knack’s study faces the same difficulties.
While Alessina and Dollar contend that there was a relationship between
democracy and aid, Knack argues that there is no evidence that aid promotes democracy.
In fact, Knack claims that aid potentially has serious consequences on society.155 His
study uses multivariate analysis, examining the impact of aid on democratization of a
large sample of aid recipient nations from 1975 to 1996. While there is a notable trend
148 Richard Youngs, “European Union Democracy Promotion Policies: Ten Years On,” 308
149 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal o f Economic
Growth, vol 5 (March 2000): 40
150 Ibid, 34
151 Ibid, 49
152 Ibid, 40
153 Ibid, 36
134 Ibid, 52
155 Stephen Knack, Does Foreign A id Promote Democracy? (College Park: Centre for Institutional Reform
and the Information Sector, 2000), 2
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towards democratization, this trend is not attributable to foreign aid.156 Moreover, the
countries that were identified as “democracy-promoting donors” were no more effective
in promoting democracy than other donor nations.157 This is perhaps one of the most
intriguing studies for the purposes of democracy aid. While Knack clearly find that there
is no relationship between aid and democratic growth, Canada and many other
democracy promoting nations continue to fund programmes whose sole purpose is to
increase the democratic nature of the recipient country. Why, then, does Canada promote
democracy abroad? It is important to recognize that Knack’s study, as well as the others,
examine aid on aggregate levels. The aid levels are often based on ODA instead of
specific examinations of democracy aid.

Moreover, these studies do not look at

individual democracy promoting programmes.

More case studies or a quantitative

approach coupled with a qualitative may yield different results.
From these studies on developmental assistance and its relationship with
democracy, the second hypothesis emerges. This hypothesis is based on the work of
Macdonald and Hoddinott, which finds that “fully free” nations, as measured by the
Freedom House Index, received more aid,158 and the work of Berthelemy and Tichit’s
study, which contends that world aid is tied to civil liberty and political freedoms.159
From these studies, it is hypothesized that more democratic nations will receive more
assistance from Canada, and hence, democracy aid is positively related to democracy
levels, as measured by the Freedom House index.

For the purpose of this study, a

156 Stephen Knack, Does Foreign A id Promote Democracy? 21
157 Ibid, 20
158 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political? 306
159 Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ariane Tichit, Bilateral Donors ’ A id Allocation Decisions: A ThreeDimensional Panel Analysis, 11
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curvilinear relationship would represent this finding. The hypothesis does make a great
deal of sense. Less democratic countries, specifically those with a rating of 7 on the
Freedom Flouse index, are less likely to have in place the mechanisms, will and support
to promote democracy.

After all, it is argued that democratization is an internal

movement. With that said, nations are more wary to spend vast amounts of money in a
nation that is difficult to undertake. This only increases the already skeptical nature of
the public and, more importantly, it makes it more difficult for them to show successful
progress.

It also takes into account the pre-requisites of initiating democratization

reforms, as there must be an opening of some kind.
To review, based on Knack’s quantitative work which indicates that there is no
relationship between aid and democratic growth and based on the overwhelming negative
attitude of the literature in the area of democracy promotion and CIDA, it is hypothesized
that Canadian democratic aid is not conducive to advancing the democratic nature in
recipient countries.

This is a result of Canadian programmes not being measured

adequately, due to the closed-nature and institutional failures of CIDA.

In addition,

based on these institutional failures, the agency is believed to be faulty in administering
the assistance, as well. This all adds up to an organization that has good intentions, but
because of organizational constraints and flawed evaluation methods, the organization’s
ability to produce meaningful democratic assistance is defective. The methodology that
will be used to prove this is examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter examines the methodology of this study. As noted in the previous
chapter, CIDA, as an institution, and its democratic aid programme will both be
examined to provide a clear image of Canadian democracy promotion strategies. In order
to prove the hypotheses, this study will examine the “Democracy Project Database” and
other relevant CIDA documents. This will show how aid is distributed. In addition, the
methodology involves an interview portion with a specific questionnaire designed to
gather an understanding of the organization and its policies. This section asks specific
CIDA personnel about their experiences promoting democracy abroad, their thoughts on
aid relations and their interaction with others in the agency. The Auditor General reports
for CIDA are also examined, with specific CIDA case studies and evaluations, including
the Departmental Performance Report, the Report on Plans and Priorities, and the public
responses to the document Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement
on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness. The personal experiences of the author are a part of
the study, as well. Together, this complex investigation hopes to illustrate the suspected
secretive and closed nature of this agency.
How Aid is Distributed?
From a review of the literature, it is evident that no definite database of
democratic aid exists.

In fact, according to Macdonald and Hoddinott’s study, the

Canadian government “does not publish data on aid allocation by year for all countries.”1
No study, then, has revealed relationships between democracy aid and democratic
development. Yet, this is an important part of examining the effectiveness of CIDA.
1 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?”, 300
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There are obviously multiple factors to account for democratic changes beyond the scope
of Canadian aid and, consequently, one is unable to measure the direct influence of
Canadian democratic aid on the level of democratic development in the recipient nation.
Alternatively, one is able to get a better sense of how the level of democratic
development actually influences the levels of aid, providing an important indication of
the way in which CIDA distributes and rewards successful evolvements of democratic
states. In order to examine this, CIDA was contacted for information on all programs in
all nations between 1990 and 2005. The information also includes the specific amounts
spent for each project with the percentage of programming priority. The agency had to
create the database, as one was not readily available.

This database is called the

“Democracy Project Database” and is approximately 290 pages with sides “a” and “b”.
The projects are listed according to bilateral associations and multi-lateral
organizations, including regional ones such as ASEAN.

Each project listed has the

priority name of the project, under the following headings:
1.

“the protection and promotion o f human rights. ”

2. “democratic institutions and practices, ” including “support for elections,
legislation and the media.”
3. “public sector competence, ” including the promotion of “effective, honest
and accountable exercise of power by governments” through the use of “anti
corruption initiatives, legal and judicial development, public sector reform,
decentralization and regionalism, and local/urban government.”

2 CIDA, CIDA and Governance 1998-99, (Gatineau: CIDA, unknown year), iii
3 Ibid, iii-iv
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4.

“civil society’s policy role,” including the use of civil society to increase
participation and decision-making.

5.

“political will o f g o v e r n m e n ts including the use of activities that are
designed “to build the political will of governments to respect rights, rule
democratically and govern effectively.”4

6.

“childprotection. ”

7.

“human rights, democracy and good governance. ”

The “Democracy Project Database” clearly incorporates elements of good governance
and human rights, in addition to specific democratic programming. For the purpose of
this study, priorities 1 and 6 (the protection of human rights and child protection,
respectively) are omitted from the definitional aspect of a democracy programme. This is
for a number of reasons. Firstly, a great deal of literature on human rights specifically
exists individually, without a focus on democracy policies within the concept.

For

example, Marina Ottaway argues that while promoting women’s rights in Arab nations
may contribute to democratization, it should not be considered a democracy programme,
in itself.5 Further, she finds that the struggle for democratization and women’s rights
“must be seen as separate processes.”6 The DAC also reports that while human rights
emphasis has grown over the years, it is “not always linked with policies for supporting
democratization,”7 emphasizing a dichotomy between the two terms.

4 CI DA, C l DA and Governance 1998-99, iv.
5 Marina Ottaway, W om en’s Rights and Democracy in the Arab World, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2004), 11
6 Ibid, 7
7 DAC, Final Report o f the A d Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance,
(Paris: OECD, 1997), 11
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Alternatively, the term of good governance is included in this study’s definition of
a democracy. Good governance has often been situated within an economic development
perspective, as evidenced by the use of such terms in World Bank documents, the OECD
and Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, yet from the definition guidelines previously
discussed, it has grown in the Canadian context. Now, good governance encompasses
this idea of public sector competence, emphasizing accountability to the people, anti
corruption initiatives, judicial development and decentralization policies to increase the
participation of the local government. The successful implementation of these goals, in
fact, sounds more like the policies of a consolidated democracy than solely promoting
economic growth.

In addition, Carothers argues that governance is an essential

component of its democracy programme category which also includes rule of law, civil
society and elections.8 A UNDP report also finds that “from the human development
perspective, good governance is democratic governance,”9 while Diamond links the two
terms in order to increase citizens’ satisfaction with democratic governance to enhance
the prospects of consolidation.10
Using this rationale, the “Democracy Project Database” is recoded to include only
democracy projects. A preliminary review finds that in some cases, there is a relatively
small percentage involved with respect to democratization. For example, in the case of
Chile, project number S061268, the CIDA-AUCC-University Partnerships is listed at
only 4% of “civil society’s policy role” sub-priority, totaling $67,472.84 between 2002

8 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 48
9 Sakiko Fukudo-Parr, Ngaire Woods, and Nancy Birdsall, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World, 51
10 Larry Diamond, “Consolidating Democracies,” in Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the
Study o f Elections and Voting, eds. Larence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, (London: SAGE
Publications, 2002), 223
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and 2005.11 One can plainly see that this plays a reasonably small role with respect to
democratization and by including such an entry, one could easily skew the actual results
for “meaningful” democracy programmes. Having also been warned by CIDA officials
of their tendency to classify almost every programme as democratic in nature, despite
their minimal roles, there is a need to further code the projects. Based on the report by
CIDA entitled, CIDA and Governance 1998-99, only those projects that have a total of
50% or more of the accepted priority are included. This 50% or more can be made up by
one sub-priority or by multiple ones.

In the case of multiple priorities, the

aforementioned sub-priorities must equal 50% or more total, so that if a project has a sub
priority of 10% for “civil society’s policy role”, 20% for “public will of governments”
and 30% for “public sector competence”, as in the case of the “Demobilization and
Reintegration Program” in the Congo, it will still be included. 12
A new database is created, measuring the relevant programmes and their specific
funding amounts per country per year. This total is then compared to the Freedom House
index for each individual nation.

The Freedom House index is used in this case to

measure the degree of democratization in recipient nations. From the previous chapter, it
was argued that democratization is not as easy as a simple dichotomy. Instead, it exists
along a linear path and hence, there is a need to measure the degree of a liberal
democracy in order to truly get a sense of the change within these recipient nations. The
Freedom House index, despite its shortcomings, is widely available, encompassing all the

CIDA, Democracy Project Database, (Gatineau: CIDA, 2005), 61- 61b
12 Ibid, 79
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nations in the world on a yearly basis.13 Many studies have used the index for similar
purposes.

For example, Ethier and Crawford have used it to measure increases and

decreases to the democracy levels of recipient nations. Additionally, Knack’s study used
the Polity 98 and Freedom Flouse Index.

There was close agreement on democracy

levels and changes from 1975 to 1996 in these two indices.14
Set on using the Freedom House index, this study also takes into consideration the
use of a one year lag.

This is to ensure that the measurement of democratization

adequately reflects the levels of aid. Using the Freedom House website as the source of
measurement, the political and civil rights are added together and divided by 2 to get the
democracy level for a nation.

The year lag is used as such: in order to see if the

democratic nature of a country was a prerequisite of democratic aid from CIDA, the
democracy amount for a certain year was coupled with the previous year’s democracy
level o f the nation.
Once each country’s democratic levels and democratic aid are compiled, the
democratic levels from each country are then compared to the aggregate aid levels, by
adding up all the aid for all the nations dependent on their Freedom House level. This
allows one to get a sense of which nations, on the whole, receive the most aid. It is
expected that a curvilinear relationship will emerge, with most of the aid being
distributed to the middle or “partly free” nations, encompassing the area of 3 to 5 on the
index.

L’ Todd Landman and Julia Hausermann, eds,, Map-M aking and Analysis o f the M ain International
Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance, University o f Essex, 2003;
[online]; available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/28/20755719.pdf. 12
14 Stephen Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy,” 11
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In addition to the “Democracy Project Database”, this study includes an analysis
of the reports that have been published by CIDA with respect to democratic aid. These
reports do not contain detailed reports of the rationales behind foreign aid. Instead, they
reflect the abstract nature of CIDA reporting. Despite this fact, the reports do indicate
how CIDA measures and evaluates democratic aid programmes. There are only four
main reports on democracy aid levels, from the Policy Branch and they include: CIDA’s
Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1993/94 - 1994/95, CIDA’s Support fo r
Human Rights and Democratization 1995/96, CIDA’s Support fo r Human Rights and
Democratization 1996/97, and the List o f Approved CIDA Bilateral Projects between
1982 and 1992 with a Significant Civil/Political and/or Democratization Component.
These are the only documents that CIDA has made available to the public. O f these
reports, only the 1996/97 version is available online. The others are available solely from
CIDA. These reports are used to measure the amount of funding to different branches
throughout the years, as the “Democracy Project Database” does not reflect this. This
will show how the aid is broken down by regions. It is interesting to note that with the
addition of the report entitled, CIDA and Governance 1998-99, these reports only go up
until 1999, despite the increasing calls for greater measuring of effectiveness within aid
levels. The 1998-99 report is different in nature from the proceeding documents, as it
only highlights democratic aid programmes and the cumulative totals by regions, with
again no analysis of the rationales behind the aid or how these programmes have been
implemented.
From these documents and the “Democracy Project Database”, it becomes evident
that further information is needed to adequately portray the organizational aspects of
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CIDA. The reports do not indicate why there is a lack of analysis or why the studies are
no longer conducted. More importantly, they do not indicate the progress, success and/or
failure of democracy promotion strategies. To widen the scope of the study and account
for the difficulties associated with obtaining this information, an interview phase is also
incorporated. The Auditor General reports are examined and various CIDA reports are
also studied.
CIDA As an Organization and Its Democracy Promotion Strategies
This study also incorporates an interview portion. The interview process captures
the human aspects of aid and democratization efforts. These individuals have experience
working in various developing nations, carrying out specific projects, being subject to
institutional constraints and relationships. Consequently, only CIDA personnel can shed
light into the intricate inter and intra-personal relationships that shape an institution.
While CIDA officials are not able to divulge the exact number of employees, it is
estimated to be close to 1700. The actual number of those who have direct contact with
individual programming within the democratic context is not known. While the sample
o f 35 used for this study seems rather small, these individuals are deliberately chosen
from a cross-section of branches, including the Africa and Middle East Branch (AMEB),
Americas Branch (AMER), Asia Branch (ASIA), and the Central and Eastern European
Branch (CEE).

These branches are chosen to ensure that the questions would be

answered in light of their area of expertise, attempting to include a representative picture
of those branches that deal with the implementation of democracy promotion strategies in
developing nations.

More specifically, the cross-section hopes to illustrate the

democratic aid divisions and programming that CIDA employs in different nations and
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regions. The list of departments that are contacted for interviews, including each of their
individual sub-programmes, can be found in the appendix. There are 10 contacted for the
AMEB, 6 sources for the AMER, 9 for ASIA and 3 for the CEE. Only those divisions
that are specifically tied to a region or a nation are used. For example, in the ASIA
branch, the Indonesia, Philippines, Timor Leste and South Pacific (BSE/g) is included
while the Strategic Management Division (BSR) is not. In addition, three individuals in
the policy branch for Governance and Social Development are also contacted,
specifically in the Democratic Institutions and Conflicts sub-division (YDI).

In this

department, one is chosen non-randomly for his or her extensive work in the area of
democracy promotion.

Members of the Performance and Knowledge Management

Branch (PKMB) are also contacted, as they are responsible for specific reports and
statistical analysis of the effectiveness of CIDA programs. There are four individuals
randomly chosen in this department.

The PKMB is divided into the Evaluation

department (EVAL) and the Results-Based Management (RBM) department and,
consequently, two per department are randomly selected.
Within this context, only one person, unless otherwise stated, is selected from
each division listed in the appendix. The sample is restricted to those individuals with the
titles of “development officer”, “programme officer” or “analyst”. This is consciously
chosen to ensure that those individuals who are the bridge between the various projects
and the organization illustrate the intricate relationships.

They have a more current

working knowledge of the field and deal with specific areas, regions or programmes.
Within each individual programme or sub-branch, those with the appropriate titles are
given numbers and are randomly selected.

Some sub-branches or programmess may
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have had only one individual and, in those cases, they are selected. The branches and
sub-branches are current, as of October 20, 2004. As of August, 2005, some of branches
no longer exist or were merged into other areas. For examples, the Central and European
Branch is changed, reflecting the fact that the nations have graduated from the CIDA
programming.

The CEE is now replaced by the Europe, Middle East and Maghreb

Branch (EMM).

The interviewees and branches are selected from CIDA’s online

telephone directory.
The project passed ethics reviews. Each of the individuals selected for the study
were contacted twice.

The individuals are mailed letters of information and consent

forms, informing them of the nature of this study.

The first round was distributed

November 3, 2004 at the International Cooperation Days in Ottawa, Ontario.

The

envelopes were left with a CIDA official who assured the author that they would be
distributed to their respective mailboxes.

After this first round, there were four

responses. A second round was sent by mail in May. The interviews took place over the
telephone, with a prior email notification of the questions that were to be asked. They
were informed of their rights as participants.
The questionnaire is made up of six questions which are set out to develop a
complete picture of Canadian democracy promotion strategies and, more specifically, the
organizational constraints of CIDA. It sets out to examine the experiences of those who
are specifically in the field and those who have direct contact with the programmes and
projects.

Additionally, the questions reflect the need to understand the relationship

between CIDA the various branches and other governmental agencies, like Rights &
Democracy or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. It also deals
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with the evolution of funding and the understanding of concepts like democratization to
measure the changes throughout the years and, more importantly, the openness and
transparency of the goals and strategies of CIDA.
The first question deals with the allocation of funding to various aid recipient
countries, attempting to gather a more complete expression of the CIDA initiative. The
way in which aid is allocated is an important element of the effectiveness of CIDA, as a
whole. The extent to which democratization is encouraged is reflected by the types of
programming and funding levels. More importantly, an examination of the allocation of
funding can reveal the mechanisms used by CIDA to encourage democratic development.
Question two reflects the operationalization of democratization and democracy
within the CIDA context. A review of CIDA literature exposes the abstract nature of the
concept, with no meaningful overarching definition. The question, then, is to what extent
is this true and does it have any effects on the way the programming is provided? The
question is also meant to examine the levels of interaction among the different branches
and personnel, to see if everyone is at the same understanding of these concepts and their
role as democracy promoters.
The third question deals explicitly with the relationship between the different
branches and governmental agencies. Based on Morrison’s and Groupe Secor’s findings
of bureaucratic difficulties and ineffective branch communications, this question serves
to investigate to what extent that is true today. Branch coordination and information
sharing is an essential component of effective democracy promotion strategies, as it
increases the compilation of learned lessons.
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Question four hopes to elicit a more specific examination of set backs and
difficulties with promoting democracy abroad. Literature in this area certainly shows that
aid workers face challenges with respect to delivering aid, either from the domestic
governments through corruption or from the inadequate funding mechanisms that restricts
their ability provide constructive aid programmes. Consequently, in order to understand
the limitations of CIDA, both from an organizational and more personal point of view, it
is necessary to gather the specific experiences of the aid providers who must deal with
NGOs and the organizational constraints.
Question five of this study reflects Ilan Kapoor’s 1997 interview questions.
Based on his finding that reporting is incomplete are rarely done for democratic
programmes at CIDA,15 the answer to this question should address the issue of the lack of
monitoring and measuring of democratic development in recipient nations. Kapoor’s
reports were done in the mid- 1990s, with no subsequent follow-up on the procedures and
mechanisms in place today.

While CIDA actively pursues the Results-Based

Management approach, his previous study indicates very little progress in this area.
Moreover, this study’s attempt to access these RBM documents were unproductive,
calling into question the actual degree of development in this area.

The degree of

measurement is an important indicator of the success and failures of programmes, as a
failure to adequately evaluate the lessons learned may result in a perpetuation of the same
mistakes.
Finally, question 6 reflects the need to gage success and/or failure in this field of
study. Only those on the ground and those who have access to a wealth of experience

15 Ilan Kapoor, Setting Results in Human Rights, Democratic Development and Governance at CIDA: A
Needs Assessment, (Hull: CIDA Policy Branch, 1997).
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and knowledge of specific cases of Canadian democracy promotion strategies are able to
recognize programme strengths and weaknesses. The purpose of this question is to allow
the interviewees to condense their relevant experiences and suggest ways to improve the
process. Based on the experiences of other countries from the literature review, there is
room for improvement in this area of aid and hence, this question hopes to make this
study more practical and useful to the implementation of lessons learned.
The questions and the methodology are chosen distinctly to gather an
understanding of the organization and its policies. Unfortunately, based on the response
from the interview portion of this study, it was clear that additional information was
needed. Consequently, this examination of CIDA is enlarged by a study of the Auditor
General (OAG) Reports from 1984 to 2005. The decision to use these reports is based on
the work of Buchanan-Smith and Foster who argue their importance as a “primary tool”
| £

of accountability

i n

and a means to address the effectiveness of CIDA aid.

More

importantly, the reports also address the issue of relationships, organizational constraints
and barriers to obtaining information.
In addition to the OAG reports, CIDA reports are also included. The studies that
are used are available to the public via their web-site, as ordering reports requires exact
knowledge of the title of specific reports. The reports that are used for this study include
case studies and evaluations o f Ethiopia, Haiti, Hungary, Russia and West Africa. The
report on sole-source contracts and CIDA’s Policy on Human Rights, Democratization
and Good Governance are also included. In addition, the Treasury Board of Canada
reports are also examined, including the Departmental Performance Report (DPR) and
16 Margie Buchanan-Smith and Natalie Folster, C anada’s International Humanitarian Assistance
Programme: Policy Oversight Mechanisms, 1
17 Ibid, 6
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the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) from 1999 to 2005, These reports provide an
annual explanation of the programming of CIDA and the means by which CIDA attempts
to attain their goals for the year. More specifically, the DPR for 2003-04 contains a
report card of ClDA's successes and failures of individual goals, including governance
and CIDA as an institution. Finally, the report entitled, Canada Making a Difference in
the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, is also examined.
This report recognizes the inherent problems of Canadian aid policies with measures
suggested to improve those conditions. Based on the work of the DAC, the report did
elicit a response from the public, including those individuals who work with CIDA
through an NGO or other programme opportunities.

Some individuals addressed the

problem of CIDA as an institution and their accounts are also included in this study. This
information is readily available from the CIDA website, as well.
The final addition to this study’s methodology is the personal experiences of the
author with respect to CIDA and the obtaining of their files and studies. It also includes
the individual interactions with CIDA officials and the observations obtained at the 2004
International Cooperation Days in Ottawa, Ontario. This provides an essential look into
the accessibility and accountability of officials, an important element in measuring the
effectiveness o f any aid programme.

The results of the 2004 Conference participant

evaluation survey conducted by CIDA are also reviewed to gage the success and failures
of the event, emphasizing the underlying reasons for such conferences.

This is yet

another important element in measuring the relationship between different organizations,
individuals and CIDA personnel.
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In sum, the different elements and units of measurements are used as a means to
investigate the actual impact and effectiveness of CIDA’s democracy promotion
strategies and organizational competence. The combination of specific measurements of
aid dispersals and reporting of projects and organizational constraints creates a more
accurate portrait of the Canadian International Development Agency. The subsequent
chapter reports on the findings of this study, discussing first the results of the
“Democracy Project Database” and followed by the findings of the interview phase.
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Chapter 4:
Results
This chapter examines the results of this thesis. It first examines the findings of
the CIDA democracy reports that are readily available. It then incorporates the results of
the re-coded “Democracy Project Database” which lists all the democratic aid projects
from 1990 to 2005. From this section, it will become evident that CIDA aid is widely
dispersed with no great regional focus. There is considerable difficulty with obtaining
these reports and databases and this is also evidenced from the qualitative analysis of the
interview process, CIDA projects, the Auditor General reports, and commentaries of
NGOs. From this second section, it will become obvious that there is a lack of reporting
and evaluation of democracy promotion strategies. The organization, consequently, is
closed in nature and lacks transparency.

These are all important aspects of a ill-

functioning bureaucracy. In addition, there are problems with their funding initiatives
and this is evidenced both from the “Democracy Project Database,” OAG reports and
CIDA documentation. Together, the results indicate a deeply flawed organization, one in
which overall good, quality programming is hampered by the secretive nature of the
institution.
Results of the “Democracy Project Database” and CIDA Democracy Reports
When the “Democracy Project Database” was coded, examined and compared to
the existing CIDA documents on democratization and human rights, many interesting
results were found.

First, it was clear that CIDA does not have any specific

democratization databases widely available to the public. The studies that do exist are
very limited in nature, with no general overviews and no sustainability of reporting.
Second, an examination of those documents finds that aid is widely dispersed, with no
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great regional focus. Third, the analysis of the “Democracy Project Database” indicates
that there is a relationship between democracy aid and democratic levels in a nation, with
a bell curve showing that most nations in the 3 to 5 area receive the most aid. In specific
examples, however, nations with consistently low Freedom House levels were among the
top aid recipients. One critical result is that aid fluctuates greatly throughout the years
and there is now a movement towards reducing this and focusing money into 9 core
nations.
From the

documents

available from

CIDA regarding

its

support for

democratization and human rights, it is evident that no significant analysis has taken
place. In fact, the document entitled, List o f Approved CIDA Bilateral Projects Between
1982 and 1992 with a Significant Civil/Political and/or Democratization Component, is
just that: a list. While it explains the country and the amount of funding with goals and
methods of implementation, it is still remains vague and generalized. It does not deal
with the success or failures of the programmes and it does not give the rationale behind
the choice of projects.

It also does not define what constitutes a “significant”

democratization component. It is not clear if money or the level of priority percentage
plays a role. Very little is achieved in the compilation of such information, without
analysis or explanation o f the raw data, especially when one considers that it is not an
exhaustive list.

In the subsequent studies, however, there is greater analysis and

coherence demonstrated.
The study entitled, CIDA’s Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization
1993/94 - 1994/94 and its subsequent studies in 1995/96 and 1996/97 will hereafter be
known as “HRD report for (the year)”. In these reports, there are charts to illustrate the
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actual number of projects according to specific areas in the world with the amounts that
were spent. Moreover, the papers also contain conclusions, describing the areas of CIDA
support and where Canada has decided to increase or decrease funding. Again, these
studies do not evaluate the reasons behind the aid or analyze how the project will increase
the democratic nature of the recipient country. Moreover, the lists are not exhaustive,
including only those projects that are supported by the Communications, Multilateral and
Policy branches. Consequently, it does not give a complete picture of all CIDA funding
in this area of study. In addition, these reports are only available until 1997, illustrating
CIDA’s careless abandon of evaluating such programmes and the organization’s
tendency to change their reporting methods.
Despite this negative emphasis, these HRD reports serve a useful purpose. From
them, one is able to examine how money is spent within the different branches of CIDA,
especially for human rights and democratic development.

Another criticism of these

reports, however, is the inclusion of human rights. One does not get a sense of the
importance of democratic aid. From these reports, there are changes in the percentages of
total human rights and democratic development (HR/DD) throughout the years. From
Table 1, which is obtained from the HRD reports, it is evident that this change was the
greatest in the Americas branch where aid levels as a percentage dropped to nearly onehalf. Specifically in 1993/94 and 1994/95, the Americas Branch makes up 38.2% and
40.6%, respectively.1 This number, however, drops to 18% the following year, showing
a shift in aid response with respect to democracy and human rights, most likely due to the
inclusion of the Central and Eastern Europe Branch within this context in 1995/96.
1 CIDA, CIDA's Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1995/96 (Gatineau: Policy Branch CIDA,
1997),vi and CIDA, CIDA 's Support f o r Human Rights and Democratization 1996/97, (Gatineau: Policy
Branch CIDA, 1998),vii
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Unfortunately, it is unknown if this trend continues, as the reports only go up until
1996/97. This is a significant source of failure within the measurement of democracy aid
for CIDA. There is a need for more comprehensive examination of projects based on
years, nations and regions. More importantly, there must be studies done to examine the
trends within the branches, yet this cannot be completed without a continuation of
projects from 1997/98-on, using the same methodology. It is difficult to understand why
databases are not readily available to the public, scholars and students.

This would

provide CIDA with additional research opportunities, saving the organization both time
and money.
Table 1
CIDA’s HR/DD Projects from 1982/92-1996/97 Based on Branches2
Branch

1982/92

1993/94

1994/95

1995/96

1996/97

Africa/Middle
East
Americas
Asia
Central and
Eastern
Europe
Total

$56,005,555

$12,301,069

$13,978,791

$27,380,136

$27,567,249

$13,726,471
$6,632,426
None

$33,328,029
$1,852,423
None

$24,888,296
$1,935,654
None

$14,916,783
$15,210,429
$9,372,144

$2,487,259
$14,969,930
$15,967,063

$76,364,452

$47,481,521

$40,802,741

$66,879,492

$60,991,501

With respect to regional dispersion, the funding to the different branches
previously discussed in actual dollar amounts is quite diverse.

Looking at the same

report, one notices that Africa and the Middle East are the clear favourites during the
1982/92 period at more than $56 million in aid.3 The Americas branch is second,

2 This chart was taken from: CIDA, C ID A ’s Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1996/97, viii
3 Ibid, viii.
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receiving only $13.7 million.4 Asia receives a significant boost in funding in 1995/96
and it is during this year that aid levels are most closely related to each other. It is
interesting to note the considerable reduction in aid to the Americas branch in 1996/97,
from $14.9 million to less than $2.5 million.5 Again, the report does not indicate the
reasons for this, and consequently, such data does not demonstrate the intricate
relationship of aid funding within CIDA.
Based on Table 1 from the HRD 1996/97, it is evident that there has been
significant growth in the level of aid from 1982 to 1995. In fact, more current funding
levels nearly equal the amount that was spent during the entire 1980s. For example, from
1982 to 1992, HR/DD projects totalled $76,364,452.00.6 Within a one year span, in
1993/94, this total was $47,481,521.00 with an increase to $66,879,492.00 in the 1995/96
year.7 These differences are quite dramatic. They demonstrate an increasing focus of
democratization and good governance policies at CIDA. For example, with this increase,
documents like the Government o f Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights,
Democratization and Good Governance, were introduced, setting out more specific
definitions and concepts of the terms. In addition, it also indicates a willingness to be
spending more significant amounts of aid, which is evidenced in the 1998/99 project
approval list in a subsequent document.

In CIDA and Governance 1998/99, Malawi

received more than $1.7 million in electoral assistance, while Ethiopia received $4.5
million to strengthen its legislative system. 8 There is a question, however, of how such
implementation actually occurs.

Again, CIDA’s reports are not very clear.

4 CIDA, C ID A ’s Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1996/97, viii
5 Ibid, viii
6 Ibid, viii
7 Ibid, viii
8 CIDA, CIDA and Governance 1998/99, 10

60

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

While

approved for $4.5 million, the examination of the “Democracy Project Database” and
even the report in question reveals that such funding was divided over multiple years.
For example, the total funding in the years in question from the “Democracy Project
Database” breaks down like so:
Table 2
Selected Amounts Spent for Ethiopia
From 1998-2004
Year

Amount Spent

Democracy Level

1998

$603,420.92

4.5

1999

$764,219.18

4

2000

$1,386,073.54

5

2001

$1,191,065.11

5

2002

$2,521,827.51

5

2003

$2,505,598.40

5

2004

$1,873,005.03

5

From table 2, a number o f points are evident. Firstly, the $4.5 million has been used over
a large span o f time, as the amount spent takes into consideration all o f the “meaningful”
democracy programs for the year. Such statements, then, can be misleading. In these
reports, the organization does not specify how the aid is disbursed within these
programmes. Second, it confuses the actual measurement of the relationship of aid and
democracy aid levels, or any other type of relationship that one wishes to study. With a
set amount of funding which is to be used over a certain amount of years, how can one
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actually measure the impetus and rationale behind it? For example, from this individual
case, one can see that democracy levels remained relatively unchanged, yet democracy
aid had increased, particularly from 2001 to 2002. It becomes evident, then, that aid
levels in individual countries fluctuate considerably throughout the years. The case of
Indonesia and Colombia also illustrates this. (Charts 1 and 2, respectively) The problem
with such fluctuations is the sustainability of the programmes and projects in question.
Democratization is a lengthy process and, consequently, there is a need to be more
practical and steady with funding initiatives.
Chart 1:
Meaningful Democracy Aid Levels in Indonesia
from 1990-2005
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Chart 2
Meaningful Democracy Aid Levels in Colombia from 19902005
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One report lists that “the leading recipient countries of CIDA’s HR/D support are
those which have pressing needs and are priorities for the Canadian government.”9 This
includes those nations that were in the transitional phase like South Africa who received
10% of aid and Haiti who received 23% in 1993/94.10 The following year, Haiti only
received 11.3% while South Africa had dropped to 4.3%.’1 During the 1995/96 year,
however, Rwanda received the most at 12.6%12, while for the 1996/97 year, Bosnia was

9 CIDA, CIDA ’.s' Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1993/94 - 1994/95, (Gatineau: Policy
Branch CIDA, 1996), iii
10 Ibid, iii.
11 CIDA, C ID A’s Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1995/96, iii
12 Ibid, ix
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the leader at 7.1%.13 This shows that aid levels from country to country can also change
dramatically within the years. Again, unfortunately, there is no rationale suggested for
such changes in these documents. This can have a significant impact on the sustainability
of programming, as well.
To clarify, to this point, the actual documents and studies on democracy aid by
CIDA have left much to be desired, with no specific explanations as to who gets
democracy aid and why.

In addition, the researchers also indicate that there were a

number of difficulties with their study, mainly the fact that it reflected “an incomplete
review of the work of the Agency on human right and democracy during [that] time.”14
Overall, there has been an increasing amount of money being spent on democratic aid,
throughout the years, but there is no one specific region or branch that receives
overwhelming levels of aid. Instead, greater regional dispersion is evident with CIDA
assistance. An examination of the funding for individual nations yields similar results.
In fact, a total of 158 nations have received democracy aid from CIDA at some
time during the 1990 to 2005 period. The actual amounts vary from a low of $500 for
Kuwait and Syria to the high of $52,867,268.61 for the Ukraine. The dispersion is quite
wide, as evidenced below in Table 3. A more detailed list can be found in the appendix.
(Table 4 and Table 5)

CIDA, C ID A’s Support fo r Human Rights and Democratization 1996/97, xi
14 Ibid, iii
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Table 3
Difference in Spending Amounts and Nations for Cumulative Spending
from 1990-2005
Amount Spent by Canada

Number of Nations

Less than $1000

9

$1000-$ 100,000

24

$100,001-$1,000,000

28

$l,000,001-$5,000,000

45

$5,000,001-$10,000,000

21

$10,000,001-$50,000,000

29

$50,000,000 +

2

The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat has published a report card of CIDA
self assessment of its commitments, as compared to the previous year. In the 2003-2004
report card, CIDA notes that they had “successfully met expectations” for an appropriate
geographic focus, with an “enhanced CIDA presence in a smaller number of countries
and institutions.”15 In many ways, this is seen as a positive step forward, as the Report on
Plans and Priorities (RPP) for 2002-2003 states that overall programming from 19992000 contained “3000 diverse projects” in its geographic and Canadian Partnership
branches.16 In addition, the RPP 2002-2003 also notes that despite the traditional intent
of CIDA having only “30 core countries”, “Canadian aid has, over time, tended to

15 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Canadian International Development Agency: Departmental
Performance Report (DPR) 2003-2004, [online], available from www.tbs-sct.gc/est, section 4.2
16 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) 2002-2003 CIDA Estimates,
[online], available from www.tbs-sct.gc/est
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become more and more dispersed as programming in ‘non-core’ countries has
increased.”17
The attention to this problem has led to the creation of a new strategic focus for
CIDA.

In the RPP for 2004-05, Canada notes that in 2002, Bangladesh, Bolivia,

Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Tanzania were listed for
increased investment and concentration of CIDA resources.

18

*

•

They attribute their choices

to “long-standing development ties with Canada” and the countries’ ability to employ
programs effectively, “through commitments to improve governance, respect human
rights and end corruption.”19 It is interesting to note the inclusion of Bangladesh in this
list, as the nation has been previously perceived to be the most corrupt.

20

There also remains a question of new funding motivations. It has been noted that
there is an increase in the level of funding to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
This study finds this to be true. Funding in Afghanistan has increased significantly in the
period post- 9/11. In 2000, it received a little more than $1,500 in democracy aid, but in
2002, this number jumped to nearly $3.25 million. In the case of Iraq, the nation received
no funding prior to the 2004 period. Most likely based on the current war, there has been
a significant injection of funding into the nation with $1,651,246 in 2004 and $500,000 in
2005. These numbers suggest that on an individual basis, more democratic nations do not
necessary gain more aid. This is contrary to the CIDA commitments to spend more
money in those nations who are most deserving, which includes this idea of respecting

17 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) 2002-2003 CIDA Estimates,
[online], available from www.tbs-sct.gc/est
18 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) 2004-2005 CIDA Estimates,
[online], available from www.tbs-sct.gc.ca
19 Ibid.
20 Danielle Goldfarb, “Who Gets CIDA Grants?” 4
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democratic governance and human rights.

China and Vietnam are also appropriate

examples.
In the case of China and Vietnam, these two nations are ranked consistently low
on democracy levels, meaning that they are “not free.” This remains constant throughout
the period in question, yet the amount of democratic aid fluctuates throughout the years,
from a low o f approximately $3000 in 1993 to a high of more than $5 million in 2001 for
China. In the case o f Vietnam, the results are similar to China, with high and low aid
levels of approximately $6 million and $1.4 million, respectively. From these specific
cases, there is no evidence to suggest that aid amounts are tied to democratic progress or
attention to human rights. One of the most problematic aspects of CIDA with respect to
Canadian democratic aid is the lack of consolidated information of the rationale behind
the programming.

Together with the high dispersal rates to multiple countries and

multiple programmes, there is a sense that the agency is not organized and that makes it
very difficult to deliver effective democracy promotion strategies in developing nations.
When examining aggregate levels, however, one can see a relationship between
the amount spent based on the “Democracy Project Database” and the Freedom House
levels. Chart 3 illustrates a bell curve, with most of the aid concentrated in the 3.5 to 4.0
range, decreasing towards 1 and 7.
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Chart 3
Cumulative Aid Amounts for All Nations Receiving “Meaningful” Democracy Aid:
From 1990-2005
Aid Amounts B ased on Freedom House Index from 1990-2005
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There are a number of implications from this. While statistics were not run for
this data, it is still evident that aid most aid is given to those nations in the middle of the
spectrum of the Freedom Flouse index. These are the nations that make up the pseudo
democracy camp, having made the initial step for democratic reform. An opening for
democracy is evident in these nations and, consequently, it is easier for the aid to be
dispersed to these areas.

Those in the category 6 to 7, on the other hand, are more

complicated. It is difficult to initiate successful reform in communist nations, like China,
as the government does not officially recognize democracy aid programmes. This, in
fact, is evident in the case of Microsoft which accepted censoring restrictions from China.
Words such as “freedom,” “democracy,” “demonstrations,” and “Taiwan independence”
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are all blocked on Microsoft’s MSN website.21 The prospect of openly promoting these
issues is unlikely to be successful.

As evidenced later in the interview portion,

government involvement is an important indicator of the successful nature of
programming. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge how donors shape the
context of democracy aid. Democracy promotion is a difficult undertaking, to begin
with, and totalitarian governments can compound the difficulties associated with the
executing agencies or donor nation’s tasks. Success is awarded with additional funding
and hence, it makes sense for the funding to be concentrated in these pseudo-democratic
areas.
From Chart 3, there is a disturbing fact that more than $15.3 million is spent in
nations that have already attained the highest levels of democratic development. An
examination of the list of Table 5 shows that most of this is attributable to Canada, which
is listed as receiving $13.6 million in democratic aid since 1990. An examination of the
Democracy Project Database raw data shows that the bulk of this money is spent on
advisory services, consultants, conferences, scholarships and fellowships, or educational
development programmes within Canada.22 For example, a roundtable on Middle East
received $40,000 in funding for 2003.23

The Canadian Bureau for International

Education (CBIE) elicited $775,000 for a single educational programme in the period of
1998 to 2000.24 While some of the actual projects are hard to de-code because of the
excessive use of acronyms, the project “Evaluation Institutionnelle-WBN” elicited a total

21 BBC News, “Microsoft Censor Chinese Blogs,” BBC News, 14 June, 2005 [online newspaper]; accessed
14 June, 2005, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk
22 CIDA, Democracy Project Database, 46-54
23 Ibid, 46a-b
24 Ibid, 49a-b
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of $11,000.

25

It can be assumed that this project evaluated the Women’s Business

Network. This is another area of concern with respect to CIDA. Considering that this is
a governmental institution, all of their funding documentation should be readily and
easily available to the public. This includes a brief explanation of who receives all the
funding and what their acronyms and other common aid languages mean to the lay
person.

More importantly, it is difficult not to question the importance of these

programmes within the 1 and 1.5 range. They total a staggering $69,215,864.71 from
1990-2005. This is money that could have been spent building democratic institutions
and civil society in truly needy “not free” nations.
Finally, it is also important to mention the different rationales of CIDA aid.
While officially CIDA notes the importance of good governance, human rights and
democratization and the existing relationships with these nations, a look at their current
programming frameworks also illustrates additional factors.

The so-called “trinity of

mixed motives” which includes humanitarian, political and commercial reasons for aid
are also an important aspect.26 For example, in the Vietnam Programming Framework
report, CIDA notes that Vietnam receives aid because of the large population of
Vietnamese-Canadians, showing the importance of internal pressures.27 In the case of
China, it mentions the intensity of the nation’s problems, especially in the areas of
poverty, the environment, and governance,28 emphasizing a more humanitarian motive.
The fact that China is a major player in international trade may also prove more
reasonable.

In the document Our Commitment to Sustainable Development, CIDA

25 CIDA, Democracy Project Database, 50a-b
26 David R. Morrison, A id and Ebb Tide: A History o f CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, 13
27 CIDA, Vietnam Programming Framework 2004-2009, (Gatineau: CIDA, 2004), 6
28 CIDA, “China Country Development Programming Framework 2004-2009,’’[online]; available from
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
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objectives to building democratic development and economic liberalization are linked to
•

29

the objectives of “facilitate[ing] Canadian trade and investment links with the region.”

Former Minister for International Cooperation, Maria Minna, also notes the case of Chile
and its “progress on both economic and democratic fronts.” In fact, she emphasizes that
between 1992 and 1999, “two-way trade between Canada and Chile nearly doubled” and
“Canadian exports increased by several hundred percent,”30 showing a more selfish
reason of trade opportunities. These examples all account for the varying levels of aid
dispersal. Yet, these cases clearly indicate that the more selfish domestic reasons for aid
and their levels. If Canada does not have the best interest of these nations at heart, then
the actual effectiveness is hampered, as these ulterior motives may take precedence over
sustaining funding in those nations that need democracy aid.
To conclude, this examination of CIDA reports and the “Democracy Project
Database,” yields a number of results.

CIDA’s evaluation methods are highly

inadequate, with reporting that is not widely available.

Moreover, there are no

democratization databases available to the general public and the reports that are
available are not complete in nature. The reporting is not sustained and the projects do
not provide any analysis of the programming or the rationale behind the development
missions and aid levels. An examination of these CIDA documents and the “Democracy
Project Database” shows that aid is distributed widely to many countries and to many
programmes. This has an important consequence: the sustainability of aid is called into
question. With democratization known to be a lengthy process, this can have adverse
affects on the democracy programmes in the recipient nations.

There have been

29 CIDA, Our Commitment to Sustainable Democracy, [online], available from www.acdi-cida.iic.ca
30 Maria Minna, “Democracy Across the Americas - What It Really Means for Business,” 11 April, 2001,
[online]; available from www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
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indications that CIDA is beginning to focus its aid into nine core nations, based on
previous relationships with Canada and commitments to improve governance. Yet, over
the years, there is no denying Canada’s relationship with

China, Vietnam and

Bangladesh, making one question how serious CIDA really is. Moreover, there is a
substantial funding awarded to democratic nations, like Canada and other so-called “free”
countries.

Most importantly, the overall general impression of CIDA is that it is an

organization that is secretive in nature. It is one that does not overtly deal with the issue
of democratic aid,

despite the significant funding that is distributed for these

programmes, and more importantly, there is no coherent pattern of funding initiatives or
sustainability of projects. These findings are replicated in the interview phase of the
study, followed by the examination of more qualitative CIDA and Auditor General
reports.
CIDA: A Secretive Bureaucracy?
The interview phase of this study exhibits little participation and knowledge of
CIDA programming. Dealing with the issue of funding, projects, and relationships, the
results of the interview phase of the study are quite interesting. From the 35 people who
were contacted, only a total of 4 responded. Two, in fact, accepted the request to be
interviewed, while two were unable to participate. This is a rate of return of only 11.4%
with a rate of participation equaling only 5.7%.

Despite being in very separate

departments, one was from the Performance and Knowledge Management Branch while
the other individual works in the Asia Branch, each of the interviewees have similar
answers to the questions posed with a few notable exceptions.
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Question one deals with the allocation of funding to recipient nations, asking the
importance of democratization, strategic interests and recipient pleas in the decision
making process. The official from the PKM branch notes that funding is related to both
requests and research. If government officials come to them with specific needs, it is
investigated and CIDA does its best to grant them. CIDA does distribute funds according
to their priorities, following the documents that CIDA has published over the years. The
organization pays attention to the needs of the recipient nations and often, funding will be
shifted according to changes in the priorities of the countries. When CIDA does go back
after a few years to see the costs associated with the programmes, officials have noticed
that the programmes differ from the original estimates.

She does not specify if the

change involved an increase or decrease in funding, however.
The official from the Asia branch has a greater relationship with the way aid is
dispersed, often being the liaison between programming and the organization. He finds
that, similarly, multilateral meetings and the relationships between Canada and the
recipient nation does play a role in the funding process. More importantly, though, the
assessment of specific situations plays a much larger part. The report, Strengthening Aid
Effectiveness, is decisive in the allocation of funding and, consequently, there has been a
movement towards reducing the number of countries that receive aid. He notes, more
specifically, that aid is not dependent on the democratization level of a nation, as there
have been significant programmes in Vietnam and China over the years.

Instead,

governance plays a more critical role. Strategic interests are important to CIDA and the
government and there is evidence to suggest that the organization gives more aid to those
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with whom they trade. In the end, strategic interests are balanced with other factors, as
well. This is similar to the findings from the first section of this chapter.
Question two, which deals with the concept of democracy over time at CIDA,
elicits quite different answers. This is most likely due to the different working areas of
the individuals, with one emphasizing the direct work with NGOs and aid agencies and
the other dealing with the evaluations of the programmes.

As one can see from the

answers, there are different rationales and definitional beliefs for the term of democracy.
The evaluations officer found that the concept of democracy has evolved significantly
throughout the years.

Democratic development definitions are broad and so can

incorporate any type of project. It is so broad, in fact, that almost all programmes are
categorized under it even when only a small percentage of priority is included. There is a
long list of concepts that are included, not just good governance and democratic nature,
and she notes that this has been affecting their work. CIDA is now much more flexible
with the term.

She feels the organization is “really cheating itself’ because it is not

holding tme to the concept of democratization.
Alternatively, the official from the Asia branch finds that the concept of
democracy has not really changed in his 8 years of experience. Before he arrived, there
was a broadening of the definition to include civil society, but today there is more o f a
focus on governance instead of democratization.

He argues that the most important

determinant is the fact of whether or not the government represents the will of the people.
This is significant for a number of reasons. First, the importance of democratization
seems downplayed by those who actually deal with the programming. Second, there is an
obvious dichotomy between the way those who implement the programmes see
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democratization and the way those who evaluate the programmes see it. This can affect
the measurement of success and/or failures, by having faulty evaluation methods and
differences in the rationales between what constitutes successful programming. Third
and most importantly, there is no principal definitional aspect of democracy. This shows
that the various branches and departments have distinct ways of conceptualizing the
overarching terms of aid, affecting the way in which it is delivered and measured.
Question 3 elicits the greatest consensus. Both of the individuals argue that there
is a challenging relationship between the different branches and horizontal integration
within CIDA is problematic. In fact, both individuals note the lack of communication
between the branches and sub-branches. The Asia branch official remarks that there is a
long history of the branches not working well with each other, part of this due to the
uniqueness of each division. During the last few years, he finds that there have been
efforts to increase integration with a compilation of lessons learned and databases, but
people still tend to stay where they are and do not engage with one another. From the
PKM branch, it is also evident that there is “a big disconnect between the branches” and a
definite need to strengthen the relationship. She notes that there is certainly potential for
complementary work, but it is a busy environment. Similar to her colleague, part of this
weakness she attributes to the unique work of CIDA.

Yet, even when there are

programming opportunities for coordination and cooperation, CIDA is evidenced to be a
closed agency.

For example, the PKM officer uses the example of her associate in

Environment Canada who had wanted to set up an environmental programme in
Indonesia. Knowing that CIDA has done work in the area, he wanted to coordinate and
plan with someone who had relevant experience there. No one, however, got back to him
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and his calls remained unanswered. This shows a lack in both the interdepartmental and
intradepartmental relationships, creating an organization that does not adapt to changes
and is closed off from the public. This can have serious implications on the way CIDA is
seen and more importantly, on the way the agency carries out its programmes.
Question four deals with the problems and set backs that have been encountered
by democracy promoters at CIDA. While the official from the PKM branch does not
have direct contact with the programming, from her own research, she has found that
democracy was the last item on the mind of people who cannot meet their basic needs.
Poverty, then, is the main problem and women who have spent 5-6 hours a day looking
for water do not have time for anything else, especially taking part in a democratic
government.

In the end, democracy promotion reflects a larger multi-sectoral, inter

disciplinary issue. She also notes the implications associated with the “Western world
promoting a Western view of democracy.”
The Asia branch official, however, has a more direct view of specific CIDA
democracy promotion strategies and their major problems.

He notes that there are

significant difficulties with local capacity, meaning that the vast majority of countries are
not well-organized or well-managed to run successful programs of significant size. This
has created “a few good civil society groups that often get swamped with donor
resources” and once they become “awash with money,” they become “sloppy, corrupt or
both.” This can lead to CIDA actually undermining what they are trying to promote in
the first place.

He notes the case of East Timor where money was going into

organizations that were not ready to absorb it. In addition, the governments in these
nations often do not take civil society seriously, as they do not become deeply involved in
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the affairs of the state. He questions the actual effectiveness, then, of these programmes.
With respect to his experience with rule of projects, he observes the reluctance of
countries to make changes in these areas. It, essentially, touches to the heart of what a
developing nation is all about, their customs and their cultures. It is difficult to see how
courts could function without corruption in the judicial system, as he saw in Indonesia
and East Timor. Consequently, he found that as a donor, CIDA has to be conscious of
what can actually be obtained over a period of five years and there is a need for more
modest expectations of what can be accomplished.

Ten years ago, the Asia branch

official notes the great expectations for development in this area, yet he cannot think of a
single country where great strides have been made. This is perhaps the most important
statement he makes, as it proves the difficult nature of promoting democracy and the
need for more modest expectations.
When he evaluated the programming, he found instances of both success and
failure.

The Asia branch official notes that Jamaica and Indonesia have experienced

significant amounts of success, especially with strengthening the environmental side of
civil society and, appropriately the decision-making capacity in those countries has
improved. In the case East Timor, however, the long term prognosis of increasing the
legal capacity of the nation is challenging. They do not recognize their own limitations
and there is an inconsistency of judgments in the court system.

In Indonesia, the

problems were compounded by the imploding of NGOs after donor funding was
removed. Once donor funding was removed, Indonesian NGOs were unable to raise the
necessary funds from their indigenous government.

Moreover, a study of the local

commission of human rights showed evidence of mixed results. While individuals in the
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community filed reports and the commission handled inquiries, they were hampered by
the political environment.

The government did not want to hear about the abuses,

showing the importance of the recipient government’s involvement in these programmes.
From this, there is a sense that there must be a good relationship between the donor
community and the recipient nations.

Otherwise, sustainability and progress are

hampered, illustrating the need for an internal movement towards democratization.
Finally, the Asia branch official notes that donors have “the tendency to walk away”
when they did not see the results that they desired.

This has a serious implication:

relevant and meaningful programmes can be discontinued simply because short term
results are not adequate, yet the very process of democratization is a lengthy process.
Programming that is done in such ad hoc nature with both limited resources and internal
support are not providing effective and meaningful democratic advancement.
From the answers to question four, it becomes obvious that there are a number of
difficulties associated with programming in the area of democracy promotion strategies at
CIDA. The official from PKM makes a valid point in the underlying problems associated
with democratization, while the official from the Asia branch illustrates a more complete
overview. There are obvious difficulties with corruption in the recipient nation, overly
eager expectations on behalf of the donor, and a reluctance of the recipient government to
address the issues and take part in increasing democratization.

Most importantly, he

illustrates the cause and effect relationship of donors withdrawing funding for these
programmes. Concerned with short-term results, funding removal can cause projects and
NGOs to implode, leaving the community without the means to support important
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democracy enhancing strategies. The dispersal of funding, then, has serious implications
on the effectiveness of these programmes.
The answer to question five elicits a similar response. Both officials find that
CIDA does not actively measure results for democracy programmes. The evaluations
officer for the PKM branch notes that she is currently in the midst of evaluating projects
funded under the priority of good governance, but CIDA is finding it very difficult, as all
projects are listed under this value. Funding is multidimensional, so projects will code
for democratic development despite the small nature of it. In the past, they have also
found problems with defining populations, which is necessary for these evaluations. In
one case, it had been an ongoing process for months. The official from the Asia branch,
however, notes that there are more reports available in the human rights area, especially
on an annual basis. Alternatively, in the area of democracy promotion, there is more
significant focus on ad hoc reporting on the overall quality of governance, corruption and
rule of law issues. This, he attributes to the fact that it is a very challenging area to
measure and, in fact, it is currently a “hot button issue”. Furthermore, it is expensive to
conduct these evaluations.

From both these responses, one does get the sense that

conducting evaluations in this area is difficult, yet that should not discourage CIDA from
listing and publishing their results. By initiating in faulty evaluation methods, CIDA is
only perpetuating the cycle of faulty programming, as providers do not learn from each
other’s mistakes.
Finally question six provides an overview of how successful the strategies really
are.

The PKM branch official notes the question of accountability, as funds for

democratization are in actuality coming from the donor and, hence, government officials
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are no longer accountable to their own citizens. Moreover, democracy promotion starts
from within and handing alone is not the answer. The official from the Asia branch
agrees with her statement, but he questions how that support is going to be initiated in the
developing nation’s community. From CIDA’s perspective, there is a need to look at
more innovative ways to engage civil society. That is why it is important to know where
and how to intervene, as by supporting incorrect areas and channels, there can be
inadvertent consequences.

In addition, donors cannot fully take credit for

democratization and it is important not to overstate their contribution to society. From
both answers, there is a sense that democratization programmes have their limits and that
true success is attributable to the processes that initiate internal support for the process of
a democracy. It is also interesting to note the lack of a direct response to this question,
reinforcing the closed nature of this organization when it comes to evaluating democracy
programmes on the whole.
From these two interviewees, there is consensus that there is no overarching
definition of what constitutes a democracy for CIDA and this can have important
implications.

This makes the actual implementation of aid programmes and its

measurement very difficult to administer. Moreover, this shows a lack of coordination
between the various branches and sub-branches in the agency. In fact, this is also seen
from their answers regarding the relationship between the different branches.

Both

interviewees note a lack of communication and a long history of ill relationships between
the different areas of the agency. This can create overlapping programming and faulty
donor coordination, as the one example illustrated that even government officials from
other branches do not have their calls returned. This makes one question the relationship
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with other NGOs and other donor nations, increasing the likelihood of isolated
programming which is contrary to the rules of enhancing the effectiveness o f aid.
Another important result from the interview portion of this study is the
recognition of the success and failures of the democracy promotion strategies. With
direct experience with democratic aid programmes, the official from the Asia branch
illustrates the need for more modest expectations, as the actual impact of these projects
are limited in nature. Moreover, there is a need for more localized initiatives with the
cooperation of the recipient nation’s government, more sustainable funding must be
included, and there must be evidence of executing agencies that are appropriate and able
to absorb the funding. This requires a fundamental evaluation of the funding methods
and organizational relationships within CIDA and the NGO community.
Finally, from the interview portion, it is evident that the way aid is distributed is
dependent on the needs of the recipient nations, with a strategic focus also included.
Governance and CIDA reports, such as Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, also play an
important role. Yet, from an examination of raw data from the previous section, one can
see a relationship between democratic development and aid levels, as those in the 3 to 5
or “partly free” categorization receive the most aggregated aid. Individually, the fact that
China and Vietnam are among the top five recipients of democratic aid also reinforces the
findings of the interview portion.

There are multiple rationales for the aid and it is

unfortunate that CIDA does not clarify its choices, as this would provide a strategy for
improving democratization in these nations.
Most importantly, the officials also point out the fact that CIDA does not actively
measure results of democracy programs, with reporting done on an ad hoc basis.
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Moreover, the simple fact that only two CIDA officials responded to the study shows an
element of uncooperativeness, making CIDA appear to be closed-natured. This certainly
is true, as evidenced by the personal experiences of the author and the Auditor General
reports.
The International Cooperation Days of 2004 provided valuable first-hand
accounts o f the relationship between the NGO community, the general public and CIDA.
From first-hand observations, it was quite clear that the main goal of the NGO
community was to gamer attention to their plights or the plights of those whom they
represent.

This has a consequence with the accessibility of both participants.

For

example, despite approaching numerous individuals, no one had any comments regarding
CIDA’s democracy promotion strategies. As soon as I revealed that I was student, there
was observable apprehension and a lack of interest with speaking to me.

The rare

conversation did not result in any substantial information. Instead, there was an emphasis
on the Millennium Development Goals or the MDGs, which granted was the main focus
of the conference for 2004.
When the various kiosks and booths were approached, there was consensus that
they did not know anything about the organization’s democracy promotion strategies.
The CIDA personnel directed me to the governance branch and were frank of their lack
of knowledge. There is something fundamentally wrong with this, though. Meaningful
democracy aid has yielded more than $1 billion since 1990, yet no one really had any
comments or experiences to share.
The experiences of the author are paralleled in the results of CIDA’s survey on
the International Cooperation Days 2004 Conference. The 10 minute telephone survey
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was conducted approximately a month later, with a random sample of 301 participants.
From the survey, it was evident that high importance was placed on the opportunity to
network.

In fact, one of the main criticisms of the conference was the lack of

opportunities to network, with 11% of those surveyed citing this issue.31 There were also
criticisms with the way the event was organized. While overall, there seemed to be
satisfaction with a number of different features, including the quality of the speakers and
the exchange of ideas and experiences, participants were most dissatisfied with the
approachability of CIDA representatives.32 In fact, 28% of those surveyed expressed
dissatisfaction with “the opportunity to meet and discuss issues with CIDA
representatives.”

It would not be inaccurate to suggest that this number could be

higher, based on the nature of those surveyed. Those who had little experience with the
organization or those who do not know specific individuals at CIDA would certainly find
this to be the case. In fact, when one CIDA official was asked about the location of their
headquarters in the same city where she worked, she was unable to give the author
directions.
During the International Cooperation Days, I visited the agency. Prior to the visit,
CIDA was contacted multiple times for information on their Canadian democracy
promotion strategies. The first two emails to the general inquiries solicited no response.
These emails asked about the reports that were available regarding CIDA’s democracy
promotion strategies.

After these emails, I telephoned CIDA, hoping to speak with

someone in charge with the information and technology branch. I was first connected to

jl CIDA, “International Cooperation Days: 2004 Conference Participant Evaluations Survey,” [online];
available from www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
32 Ibid,
33 Ibid.
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someone in the library who informed me that such information did not exist. Realizing
that I was getting no where quickly, I suggested that I would visit the organization during
the CIDA International Cooperation Days. The man in charge of the database retrieval
was quite helpful in the beginning. For written documents, including the evaluation of
specific programming and two reports that did not have links on-line, I was passed to
another gentleman. He, too, was quite helpful, finding those two reports for me, yet
interestingly, the man had to speak with a manager before giving me the information.
Although, he would not say why, it is not outrageous to consider this a need for approval,
especially after the abundant evidence to suggest the closed-nature of the institution.
Moreover, I also asked if there was any additional information on this topic that he could
provide and I was again pointed in the direction of another department which did not
answer my inquiry.
At the agency, I was told that the library was for the use of CIDA personnel, only.
While this is understandable, it is hard to comprehend why there are no hardcopies of the
various evaluated projects or databases of programming, especially with respect to
specific dollar amounts. After making it quite clear in previous emails of the type of
information I required, the information and technology branch continually provided me
with the wrong information. The official noted that it is very easy to build a database of
the information that is needed. In essence, CIDA does keep track of the programmes and
their costs, with a percentage of priority for their mandates. Interestingly, it took nearly 4
months from initial contact to receive the database, with a continual reluctance to include
the dollar amounts. In fact, the first report contained only the percentage of priority with
no costs, despite overt explanations both written and oral of what my study entailed and
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needed.

The very process of gathering data from CIDA can be a painstaking, long

process, filled with many road-blocks. In one instance, it took nearly 4 days to have a
call returned. In another instance, I was handed off from department to department, with
no one sure of how to obtain information on democracy-promotion strategies.

Even

CIDA, itself, notes their insufficiency in the “Information Management/Information
Technology” branch. The 2003-2004 Departmental Performance Report notes this area
helps CIDA to engage in “effective interaction with partners” and to “meet the public’s
information needs,” but it has “not yet fully met expectations.”34 In addition, I was
frequently told that I needed to know the exact name of the document for which I was
looking. Interestingly, there is no database of the documents that CIDA has produced, so
then, it is impossible to access such information.
CIDA has made available some evaluations, from their websites. Most notably,
these are the reports on Ethiopia, Elungary, Haiti, Russia and West Africa. The projects,
overall, fail to examine specific numbers or quantifiable measurements of changes within
the society.

Some of the studies note the positive aspects, but do not give specific

examples of how those positive characteristics were incorporated within the programme
and nation. From reading the reports, there is a sense of superficial evaluation and a lack
of concentration on democracy promotion strategies. This is certainly the case with the
Hungarian example where much of the stress in the report is placed on trade and business
relationships.35 Its main finding was that the results were satisfactory with “outputs
delivered according to plan.”36 While this project cross-sampled nearly 200 projects over

34 Treasury Board o f Canada Secretariat, Canadian International Development Agency: Departmental
Performance Report (DPR) 2003-2003, section 4.2
35 CIDA, Hungary: The Transition o f Challenge, (Gatineau: Performance R eview Branch, 2003).
36 Ibid, 7
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12 years, using a questionnaire to elicit response from those who were directly privy to
the programmes, the project does not use examples or justify the reasoning for the
“satisfactory” result.37
The Ethiopian case provides more analysis with direct outcomes and indicators.
In the civil society building programme, it is found that there was a “more formal,
democratic, and transparent governance structure”, as measured by greater participatory
•
38
decision-making and greater “resource mobilization”.

It also indicates a greater

willingness “to engage in formal and informal dialogue with other civil society
organizations”, as evidenced by their increasing relationship networks and linkages.

TO

This may be attributable to the more localized initiatives. In fact, the DAC notes that “it
remains for donors to encourage regular fora for co-ordination, and to assure that their
own local representatives participate.”40 These two projects provide an illustration of the
more successful programming opportunities at CIDA. The other evaluations are more
critical in nature, yet they too suffer from the same inadequate reporting methods.
In the case of Haiti, despite the $27.5 million invested in meaningful democracy
aid for the country, Haiti democracy levels fluctuated greatly throughout the years.
CIDA has noted the structural difficulties within the nation, making it a “difficult
partnership country.”41 The environment was adversarial, with fear of violence and little
political participation, especially for rural areas.42

Specifically speaking, CIDA

recognizes a number of factors have hindered its effectiveness in Haiti, including
j7 CIDA, Hungary: The Transition o f Challenge, 1
38 CIDA, Ethiopia: Building Civil Society, A Case Study in Capacity Development, (Gatineau: Policy
Branch, 2000), 5
39 Ibid, 5
40 DAC, Shaping the 21" Century: The Contribution o f Development Co-operation, 17
41 CIDA, Haiti - Country Development Programming FrameworkZCDPF Strategic Approach: Concept
Paper, (Gatineau: Americas Branch, 2003), 2
42 Ibid, 3
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“weakness o f local partners involved,” “an excessive number of projects,” and a lack of
consideration for local realities.43 In an independent report by Rights & Democracy, it is
illustrated that “international donor agencies, for their part, have not been successful in
adapting to the volatility of the situation,” noting the need for more effective coordination
of efforts.44 There are a number of implications for this. Effective coordination ensures
that different nations are not producing the same programs in the same regions. It allows
for the spreading o f funding, so that excessive proliferations of projects do not occur in
an area that is not able to sustain it. Moreover, greater coherence can eliminate the
“duplication o f efforts” and rationalize “donor activities to make them as cost-effective as
possible.”45

This is why adequate reporting procedures are essential.

Donor

harmonization has been long noted as one of the most important aspects o f improving
aid. In fact, both the DAC and CIDA note it as a principle of effective development.46
In the case of Russia, there is a question of the actual cost effectiveness of the
Yeltsin Democracy Programme. The programme was initiated to train Russian public
and private sector managers in Canada since 1993. The audit by the Performance Review
Branch notes that the “benefits resulting from this program have been substantial”, with
many of fellows reaching high positions in the government.47 The audit also notes that a
similar German program had trained a significant amount of more personnel.

For

example, since 1998, Germany had trained nearly 5000 fellows in their programme,

43 CJDA, Corporate Evaluation o f the Canadian Cooperation Program in H aiti (1994-2002), (Gatineau:
Performance Review Branch, 2003), 14
44 Philippe Tremblay, Haiti: A Bitter Bicentennial, (Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 2003), 49
45 OECD, “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and
Mutual Accountability,” [online]; available from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/27/34504737.pdf. point 3. iii.
46 DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution o f Development Co-operation, 17 and CIDA, Canada
M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy on Strengthening A id Effectiveness, 4
47 CIDA, Yeltsin Democracy Fellowship Program: Audit Report, (Gatineau: Performance Review Branch,
2001), 10
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while Canada had only trained 500 since 1993.48 Such a wide disparity calls into
question the economic value of such programming.

Greater donor coordination and

harmonization would have been useful in this example, as well, allowing greater transfer
of knowledge between the Canadian and German initiatives.
Finally, the study on Democratic and Human Rights in West Africa has proved to
be the most comprehensive with respect to lessons learned. Section 6 of the report notes
that Canada would benefit from stronger partnerships in the area of monitoring and
evaluating activities.49

Most importantly, “to be effective, a DDHR [democratic

development and human rights] project requires a good knowledge of the environment, a
clear vision of the partner’s capabilities, structured implementation over a period of time,
and a critical approach to the intervention strategy.”50 While the report lists a significant
number of lessons learned, there is no analysis or examples mentioned. A number of
questions still remain, including to what extent are these problems pervasive and how
much of an improvement is needed? The reports seem to be

written forthe sake of

reporting, without adequate explanation of the situations at hand.
Despite the many problems associated with these evaluation projects, the reports
still provide a good indication of the lessons learned in these nations and with these
programmes. It is difficult to understand why more of these projects are not published. It
is equally difficult to understand why more analysis does not take place. Still, these
results have coincided with the answers from the interview portion.

Democracy

promotion is an internal process and there are indications to suggest both success and
failures in these programmes. Similar to the official from the Asia Branch, the local
48 CIDA, Yeltsin Democracy Fellowship Program: A udit Report, 10
49 CIDA, Democratic Development and Human Rights (DDHR): West Africa, (Gatineau: CIDA, 1995), 6.4
50 Ibid, 6.21
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environment does play an important role and the recipient governments must actively
take part in these programmes. The issue of donor coordination is more stressed in these
reports, as well as greater emphasis of funding as opposed to excessive proliferation. The
most critical point from these reports again is the recognition for the lack of reporting on
lessons learned. In fact, this is reinforced by CIDA’s Ilan Kapoor’s and the Auditor
General’s reports.
Kapoor’s preliminary study on democratic and human rights programmes found
that essentially, there was no monitoring of democratic development.51 In fact, in the
report published in 1996, there was evidence that “little research or project activity [had]
been done to date” on democratic development.52 A subsequent follow-up study was also
conducted by Kapoor and similarly, it was found that little improvements had been
made.53 Granted, the follow-up was only a year later.

Over time, there has been

evidence to suggest that some improvements at CIDA have been made.
From the OAG reports, there is a clear progression towards a more
comprehensive examination of CIDA programming. Unfortunately, there was a very
slow start. For example, in 1984, it was noted that the organization had not “developed
adequate mechanisms to document, store and use past experiences.”54 This resulted in
programme officers who were “unaware of completed studies.”55 This can be very
problematic in many respects, including the training of new personnel. For example, in
the study by Phillip Rawkins, a new officer mentioned the difficulties sustained by new
51 Ilan Kapoor, Indicators fo r Programming in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Preliminary
Study, (Hull: CIDA Policy Branch, 1996), 1
52 Ibid, 4
5’ Ilan Kapoor, Setting Results in Human Rights, Democratic Development and Governance at CIDA: A
Needs Assessment, 1
54 OAG, “ 1984 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 9, Canadian International Development Agency”,
[online]; available from www.oag-bvg.gc.ca. 9.153
55 Ibid, 9.153
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recruits. In the late 1980s, the new recruit stated that policy documents were the main
source of awareness for the policies of the organization, but these were not implemented
directly.56 Much of the learning experience was a result of colleague interaction, with
specific attention paid to their management plans.57 This, in fact, may be attributable to
the actual evaluation mechanisms. The 1984 OAG report had found that evaluation had
not

actually

been

“integrated

and

co-ordinated”

with

“different

levels

of

fjj

evaluation...[serving] different objectives and clients.”

More importantly, the OAG

report stipulates that project responsibility lies with the CIDA headquarters, but the
project officers “do not have enough knowledge of the projects, problems, or
circumstances to offer appropriate responses.”59
The next OAG report on CIDA was in 1988. In this report, the case of Tanzania’s
Wheat Programme is used to illustrate the fact that CIDA’s monitoring mechanisms were
faulty. In this case, after one year implementation of the programme, no field director
had been sent and no technical monitor existed.60 It also noted that the observations from
project visits were not aggregated or used in future reports.61 Again, it states that “there
is no evidence that the Branch compares actual performance against the evaluation plans
or that it takes action when plans are not met.”62 This affects the way the aid agencies
carry out their mandates and contracts, as the Auditor General has noted that not all the

56 Phillip Rawkins, “An Institutional Analysis o f CIDA,” in Canadian International Development
Assistance Policies: A n Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994),
171
57 Ibid, 171

58 OAG, “ 1984 Report ofthe Auditor General: Chapter 9,” 9.156
59 Ibid, 9.87
60 OAG, “1988 Report ofthe Auditor General: Chapter 9, Canadian International Development Agency,”
[online]; available from www.oag-bvg.gc.ca. 9.32
61 Ibid, 9.71
62 Ibid, 9.74
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contracts have been followed.63 Knowing that officials are not measuring the impact of
the programmes, there is more freedom for the NGOs to deviate. During this report,
there were some indications that different branches “have begun to place more emphasis
on the integrity and accuracy of their data,”64 but overwhelming evidence indicates that
this is little in nature.
In the 1993 report, CIDA is criticized for not being a “learning organization”.
Again, despite the continual notes in the previous documents on the faulty nature of
measuring effectiveness and performance, CIDA still had “no formal mechanism or
requirement to capture lessons learned or to use them.”65 Moreover, project evaluations
were done on an ad hoc basis, failing to guide future work.66

Instead, CIDA

acknowledged that learning was done through an oral process with staff interaction and
•

consultations.

67

Yet, the OAG office reported that staff was “less than open in

responding to questions about what problems were encountered in the implementation of
•

•

their projects.”

68

By 1993, the report mentions some project evaluations, notably the 18

examined projects from the Bilateral branch. This does show some development from
the previous years, yet again the OAG report notes that the evaluations were not
“systematically fed into future project appraisals” and different standards and
operationalizations were used among the reviews.69 This, however, is not surprising, as
there are fundamental problems with the tenures and experience of CIDA personnel. In
6' OAG, “ 1988 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 9, Canadian International Development Agency,”
9.16
64 Ibid, 9.56
65 OAG, “ 1993 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 12, Canadian International Development Agency:
Bilateral Economic and Social Development Programs,” [online]; available from www.oag-bvg.gc.ca.
12.100

66 Ibid, 12.99
67 Ibid, 12.100
68 Ibid, 12.98
69 Ibid, 12.106
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fact, the Auditor General recognizes that in a single Pakistani project, over the years,
there were four different project team leaders, three monitors and four field officers.70
Such inconsistency makes it very difficult for planning and sustaining project
evaluations.
The 1994 report includes the rationale by Foreign Affairs for not conducting
project evaluations and effectiveness studies, specifically using the case of technical
assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. First, it is noted
that such measurement was not practical, as multiple donors exist in the same nation and
it is difficult to isolate the impact of Canadian aid alone.71 Second, the department notes
that their impact can only be measured over a longer period of time.

79

While true, there

is still a need to conduct comprehensive reviews and evaluations of projects. Without it,
a question o f accountability is made. How does the organization know if where the funds
are being spent and if the costs are reasonable for the proposed progress? The 1994
•
*
•
report includes emphasis on the introduction
of annual audit
plans, 73 but future studies

have show that this form of measurement is weak, most notably in the case of sole-source
contracting and the Yeltsin Democracy Programme.
To this point, there has been overwhelming evidence of the inherent problems in
the structure of monitoring methods and measuring of effectiveness. CIDA, itself, had
recognized the difficulties throughout the years, but had done relatively little to improve
the situation. In 1994, this, in effect, was believed to have been addressed with the

70 OAG, “ 1993 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 12, Canadian International Development Agency:
Bilateral Economic and Social Development Programs,” 12.51
71 OAG, “1994 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 21, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada:
Technical Assistance Contributions to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” [online];
available from www.oag-bvg.gc.ca. 21.54
72 Ibid, 21.55
73 Ibid, 21.86
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implementation of the ideals behind the RBM approach. The RBM approach sets out
better standards for study.

The RBM calls for identifying programs and goals,

monitoring results obtained throughout the life of the project, and most importantly,
reporting on the achieved results.74 Indeed, it is evident that the number of project
evaluations increased from the availability of specific programme and country studies by
CIDA. These were the studies that were previously discussed, yet these reviews are still
superficial in nature, without specific examples and explanations of the results. Despite
this, the OAG report for 1998 still finds fault with the system, specifically with the fact
that once projects were completed, CIDA did not determine the effects of the
programme.75 This has a number of implications, as the process of democratization is a
lengthy one, requiring significant time to pass before the true effects can be determined.
Similarly, the 2000 OAG report indicates increased monitoring. For example, it states
that:
CIDA staff attach[ed] considerable importance to
monitoring projects under their responsibility. They
commonly use monitors under contract to review
and report on the progress being made, and they
insist on receiving periodic reports from the Canadian
executing agencies as stipulated in the agreements.76

Interestingly, from this quote one can see the CIDA has placed “considerable
importance” to the monitoring aspect, yet the Auditor General makes no mention of how
successful and how widespread this examination is. Moreover, CIDA is not the one who

74 CIDA, “Results-Based Management in CIDA - Policy Statement,” (Gatineau: Performance Review
Branch, 1996), [online]; available from http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf70/9c32f96287da21d885256c3b006224c7?OpenDocument
75 OAG, “ 1998 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 21, Canadian International Development Agency:
Geographic Programmes,” [online]; available from www.oag-bvg.ac.ca. 21.37
76 OAG, “2000 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 14, Canadian International Development Agency:
Managing Contracts and Contribution Agreements,” [online]; available from www.oag-bvg.ec.ca. 14,85
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is conducting these reports, as it clearly states the use of “monitors under contract”. It is
easy, then, for these aid providers to overstate the positive results of programming, as
better results may equate with additional funding. This leaves the agency significantly
separate from the process entrenched in democracy promotion strategies, making it
difficult for them to come up with better methods and projects. Moreover, in this report,
the monitors have complained about CIDA’s clarity with respect to these reports.

77

The

executing agencies “expressed their frustration...over expectations for these reports, and
the time taken to produce them.”78 They are not sure what is required of them and, more
importantly, they spend a considerable amount of time trying to satisfy CIDA’s unclear
reporting procedures.

This wasted time could be used to further their democracy

promotion agendas. In addition, the OAG report reveals further problems, especially
with respect to funding initiatives and control over grants.
The first significant problem seen from these reports is the issue of who receives
the funding. In the 2000 report, the Auditor General found that the selection process
encourages “CIDA staff, consultants and developing country officials to present
anticipated project results as optimistically as possible, even if experience suggests that
more modest expectations would be realistic.”79 Again, this is no surprise, as aid officials
and NGOs all seek to promote their own self-interests. There is a sense that the entire
process is a game, with those who know how to adapt and how to sell themselves
receiving the most funding. This, however, can leave out important segments of the
NGO and aid community, as the focus has now been placed on unachievable and

77 OAG, “2000 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 14, Canadian International Development Agency:
Managing Contracts and Contribution Agreements,” 14,86
78 Ibid, 14.86
79 Ibid, 14.30
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unrealistic goals. Such unattainable goals may, in fact, be the reason behind the lack of
evaluation, as early on it becomes obvious that the organization will not be able to meet
its expectations. This is similar to what the official from the Asia branch argued. There
is a need to be more realistic and to adopt more modest expectations.
In addition, this quote illustrates the need for more localized attention from the
donors. This was also mentioned in the Strengthening Aid Effectiveness report. Canada
has recognized the need to improve a sense of local ownership, because only then, can
the aid objectives be fulfilled and sustained.80 Furthermore, by allowing such un
localized processes to occur, Canadian agencies are not setting a positive example of
what democratization entails, which is mainly active participation.

Instead, they are

sending a contradictory message, which could possibly undermine their democracy
promotion strategies.
Secondly and more disturbingly, there is also a problem with the way funds are
distributed.

This is particularly the case with CIDA and sole-source contracts.

The

report Soie-Source Contracts by the Performance Review Branch notes that they are used
as a means to increase “efficiency,

effectiveness and savings into program

management.”81 Despite its noble causes, there are some serious problems with such
contracting. Firstly, according to CIDA, in 3 out of 27 contracts reviewed, there was no
justification for the rates used and “no demonstration that the rates set were the lowest,
considering market conditions.”82 Secondly, there were some instances where there were
no open competitions, when the Auditor General believed there were other qualified

80 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy Statem ent on Strengthening A id
Effectiveness, 4
81 CIDA, Sole-Source Contracts: Internal Audit Report, (Gatineau: Performance Review Branch, 2002), 5
82 Ibid, 7
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candidates.8-3 Moreover, the Auditor General also examined 19 contribution agreements
which were worth more than $100,000 each. All 19 were not open to competition, being
coded as either a “responsive contribution agreement” as a result of unsolicited proposals
or a “traditional contribution agreement” which are not open to competition. 84 This was
after the Auditor General recommended a separate group to review these agreements.
CIDA did not follow the recommendations and instead, continues to allow each branch to
“carry out its own reviews.”85

These reviews, however, are not mandatory and,

consequently, there was no evidence of such reviews taking place.

86

There is also an issue with how the funding is distributed within a project, like the
Yeltsin Democracy Fellowship Programme.

In this case, the Performance Review

Branch found that there was not “set up a competitive bidding process or a post re-entry
competition for the projects.”87

Moreover, certain regions were not privy to the

knowledge of the programme, creating a condition where “there was not equal
opportunity for all fellows to submit proposals for projects.”

88

•

This means that CIDA

may, in fact, have overpaid for services, as the executing agency did not live up to its
expectations.

Additionally, four cases have shown that there were violations to the

Government Contracts Regulations, as files stated simply that “the best firm or individual
had been selected at the best cost.”89 Such situations call into question the accountability
of CIDA. This was also evidenced by the case of Transelec.

83 OAG, “2005 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 5 - Status Report, Canadian International
Development Agency: Financial Compliance Audits and Managing Contracts and Contributions,” 5.20
84 Ibid, 5.21
85 Ibid, 5.22
“ Ibid, 5.22
8/ CIDA, Yeltsin Democracy Fellowship Program: Audit Report, 9
88 Ibid, 9
89 Ibid, 8
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In 2000, the Minister for International Cooperation, Maria Minna, was forced to
answer questions about “the choice of Transelec in the prequalification stage, when it did
not meet the basic criterion of 51% Canadian ownership.”90 Subsequently, the system
was changed according to Minna, but Monte Solberg, the MP for Medicine Hat, noted
that the company “did not meet the minimum score to apply.”91 In addition, the 2005
financial audit found that:
CIDA staff had released a high proportion of ineligible
expenses that Canadian executing agencies had
claimed, even though these agencies did not provide
adequate documentation or other evidence to support
their claims. [It was] concluded that CIDA’s releases
Q9
were not always justified.
From this quote, there is a sense that CIDA is not careful with the way funding is
distributed.

By releasing ineligible expenses, the executing agencies are wasting

precious, limited resources. These are funds that could be spent in other nations or on
other programmes.

On the positive side, it is noted that improvements were being

made.93 In fact, there was a difference from 82% in the 1999 audit to 50% in the 2005 94
Yet, this is still unacceptable. Moreover, despite the recognized faults in 1999, CIDA did
not set up a “more formalized role...[for] financial officers in approving the release of
audit adjustments such as an independent sign-off for the release.”95 It is hard to
understand why even after these problems have been identified CIDA does not make a
more significant effort to improve them.
90 Parliament Proceedings - Benoit Sauvageau, E dited Hansard, no 130, Tuesday, October 17, 2000,
[online]; available from www.parl.gc.ca
91 Parliament Proceedings - Monte Solberg, Edited Hansard, no 130, Tuesday, October 17, 2000, [online];
available from www.parl.gc.ca
92 OAG, “2005 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 5 - Status Report, Canadian International
Development Agency: Financial Compliance Audits and Managing Contracts and Contributions,” 5.61
93 Ibid, 5.62
94 Ibid, 5.64
95 Ibid, 5.64
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From both the Auditor General and CIDA reports, a number o f results are
observed. First, in accordance to the observations from the International Cooperation
Days and the interviews, CIDA’s reporting processes are indeed faulty. The projects are
done on an ad hoc basis, without analysis or specific examples of the difficulties
encountered in these recipient nations. The history of the organization, as portrayed by
the Auditor General, is one of closed nature. In 1993, CIDA staff was “less than open in
responding to questions” and the author’s personal experiences indicate that is still true
today. While CIDA has made greater strides towards more evaluations, it is unclear how
successful they truly are.

Moreover, it is not CIDA conducting the monitoring, but

“monitors” or executing agencies. In addition to the organization’s lack of concern with
evaluation, there has been evidence suggesting fiscal mismanagement. Interestingly, this
fiscal mismanagement can be attributed to this lack of monitoring, as well. The issue of
sole-source contracts reveals that certain companies and NGOs receive funding without
being subject to competition. This is despite the fact that the Auditor General’s findings
reveal that there were other qualified candidates. Moreover, there are instances where
CIDA pays more than it should and releases ineligible expenses to the executing
agencies.
Finally, CIDA itself recognizes the difficulties it encounters with aid
programming, specifically in the document, Canada Making a Difference in the World: A
Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness. Similar to the observations of the
official from the Asia branch, local ownership, improved donor coordination, stronger
partnerships and greater coherence are all needed to improve the principles o f aid
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delivery.96 There is a definite need to improve monitoring and evaluation of programmes
and, hence, the report suggests that a results-based approach be used.97 Besides the
statement of aid being dependent on a number of factors, including the commitment to
democracy, good governance and human rights in the developing nation, democracy and
democracy promotion strategies98 are not mentioned in this report.

Again, this only

emphasizes the lack of attention that is paid to this area of study by CIDA.
This paper did have significant consultations and discussions. In fact, there were
meetings held across Canada, briefs submitted and commentaries published on CIDA’s
website.99 Two individuals with experience with CIDA reinforce the findings of this
study. Bob Olivero of Memorial University and Nabil M. El-Khodari of the Nile Basin
Society both have extensive relationships with the organization, privy to CIDA projects.
El-Khodari notes that “contact with responsible officers within CIDA produces little (if
any) information.”100 He is the founder of the NGO, however, implying that this problem
with transparency and contact is widespread. Olivero was a former United Nations staff
member with experience working for UNDP, CUSO and CIDA. He finds that CIDA
needs “to enhance the transparency and accountability of its future administration and
operations.”101 Moreover, he argues that the way the programmes are currently set up,
there is opportunity for “fraud and malfeasance”, as a result of “limited oversight.”102

96 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy> Statement on Strengthening A id
Effectiveness, 4
97 Ibid, 4
98 Ibid, 26
99 Ibid, 3
100 Nabil M. El-Khodari, “The Nile Basin Initiative,” Strengthening A id Effectiveness Consultation, 19 July,
2001, [online]; available from www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/extranet/policy/aidecons.nsf
101 Bob Olivero, “The Need for Enhanced Oversight o f CIDA Projects and Programmes,” Strengthening
A id Effectiveness Consultation, 7 July, 2001, [online]; available from www.acdicida.gc.ca/extranet/policy/aidecons.nsf
102 Ibid.
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During these proceedings, the Canadian Bureau for International Education or the CBIE
contends that from their experience with CIDA, there is a need to reduce reporting, since
“many reports are not read by CIDA staff because of their heavy workloads.” 103 This
also provides insight into CIDA’s attitude with evaluation procedures, showing how
fundamental changes must be made to the attitude of the organization as a whole.
This second section which examines the results of the interviews, the CIDA
documents, Auditor General reports and Strengthening Aid Effectiveness consultations
reinforces the findings from the raw data on democratic aid. Firstly, the interviews reveal
the challenges in relationships within CIDA, emphasizing the distinct nature of the
branches. It also reveals the messy nature of aid donations, with multiple factors playing
a critical role. Moreover, the actual conceptualizing of terms like democracy are varied,
showing the lack of consensus at CIDA and the need for more overarching, clear
governance and democratic aid institutionalization. Second, similar to the findings from
the data portion o f this study, a search of CIDA documents does not yield any significant
studies on democracy promotion strategies. The only studies available are vague and
generalized, without specific explanations of the situations in these nations.

The

interviews do provide a good clarification of the problems and successes associated with
democracy promotion, including the issue of oversaturation of resources into areas unable
to effectively use the funding. Alternatively, in other cases, there was a problem with the
sustainability of the programming, especially after resources were prematurely withdrawn
from the nation. This is similar to the findings from the first portion of this chapter.

103 Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE), “CBIE Response to Strengthening Aid
Effectiveness”, Strengthening A id Effectiveness Consultation, 4 August, 2001, [online]; available from
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/extranet/policy/aidecons.nsf
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Most interestingly, both of the interviewees find that CIDA does not actively measure
democracy results for their projects. Personal experience also reveals apprehension from
CIDA and the simple act of obtaining the raw data from the “Democracy Project
Database” was a lengthy and difficult process.

The OAG reports similarly indicate

difficulties with the organization’s documentation methods, with little coordination and
monitoring of aid programmes. In addition to these issues, there are great problems with
the funding distribution, as evidenced by sole-source contracts and the case o f Transelec.
CIDA has paid for ineligible expense and similar to the analysis from “Democracy
Project Database” there is evidence to suggest that aid is not being spent properly to
further the democratic development in developing nations.
To conclude, this chapter has illustrated the problematic nature o f CIDA as an
institution, calling into question the effectiveness of their democracy promotion
strategies. Not only is aid distributed on an ad hoc basis, but there is a lack o f evaluation
and reporting methods noted.

The actual interaction with CIDA illustrates an

organization that is closed and one that lacks transparency.

From the OAG reports,

interviews and CIDA documents, many faults within the funding initiatives are revealed.
All this points to an institution that does not have the necessary policies in place to
engage in meaningful and effective democracy promotion strategies. By being more
open and vigilant to evaluations and participation, Canadian programmes would be better
suited to meet the needs of their developing nations.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
An analysis of the results of this study indicates that both hypotheses were proven
true.

CIDA aid is excessively dispersed to many nations.

Additionally, Canadian

programmes are not being measured, as a result of organizational failures within CIDA.
This closed-nature also contributes to faulty administration of assistance and together this
creates an institution that does not have the policies that are conducive to promoting
meaningful democratic aid. There is a curvilinear relationship between democratic aid
and democratic levels in the recipient nations on an aggregate basis, with the least
amount of aid awarded to the most and least democratic nations (levels 1 and 7 on the
Freedom House index). With that said, an individual examination also showed that nondemocratic nations like China and Vietnam receive significant levels of funding. The aid
within the nations also fluctuates greatly from year to year. Together, the effectiveness of
the organization and its democratic aid policies are faulty in nature. These results are
similar to the existing literature.
From the results, it is obvious that the project funding varies throughout the years
to many different nations and many different programmes. Consequently, there is no
great regional focus, with the exception of the data from 1982 to 1992. This is similar to
the findings by Goldfarb. In her examination of CIDA grants, she found an “unusual”
dispersal of CIDA aid, as most nations typically have a regional focus.1 Her study did not
examine democracy aid specifically and, hence, this suggests that the relationship among
the different areas of focus, including poverty reduction aid and ODA, may be the same.
This, then, is a larger fault within CIDA and not just its area of democratic assistance.

1 Danielle Goldfarb, “Who Gets CIDA Grants?”, 3
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The wide distribution of funds by democracy promoting agencies has long been
mentioned as a problem area. In Morrison’s study, it is noted that because of CIDA’s
wide aid dispersal, Canada has a “relatively marginal aid presence even in core countries”
and this has made a CIDA official envious of the Swedish or Danish system.

In

Strengthening Aid Effectiveness, CIDA itself recognizes that “Canada has consistently
been the least concentrated of all the donor countries of the DAC,” introducing the
concept of enhanced partnership.3 The DAC also criticizes such a distribution system,
noting how this perpetuates aid weakness.4 In fact, this is a large part of this study’s
argument. The democracy promotion strategies are faulty in nature as a result of such
wide aid dispersal. From the literature review, it was argued the Dutch aid programme
increased its effectiveness substantially after the programmes were cut to only aid 17
nations, instead of the previous 80.5

Collier, then, equates aid effectiveness with

concentrating resources. This was also mentioned in the interview process by the official
from the Asia branch.
CIDA has attempted to address this issue, by instituting that officially the bulk of
Canadian bilateral aid will go to 20 to 30 nations, coordinating and focusing Canadian
funds.6 Nonetheless, it is unsure what the consequences of this action will be. Current
evidence suggests that the actual impact of the programs may be limited, once funding is
removed. The question of sustainability has now taken a particularly poignant place in
examining Canadian democracy promotion strategies, mainly attributable to this new
2 David R. Morrison, “The Choice o f Bilateral Aid Recipients,” in Canadian International Development
Assistance Policies: A n Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal: M cG ill-Q ueen’s U niversity Press, 1994).
3 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening A id Effectiveness,
9

4 DAC, Shaping the 21s' Century: The Contribution o f Development Co-operation, 15
5 Paul Collier, M aking A id Smart: Institutional Incentives Facing Donor Organizations and their
Implications fo r A id Effectiveness, 3
6 Andrew Mills, “Shakeup on Aid: CIDA to Revamp Aid Strategy,” Toronto Star, 9 March, 2005, A1
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focus on core nations. This relatively simply move by the Canadian government, while
honourable in its intentions of addressing a historically negative aspect of their policies,
can affect the very nature of sustainability of projects. This, in fact, is evidenced from the
interview with the Asia branch official. Moreover, this can have a lasting impact on
Canada’s overall effectiveness of democracy promoting strategies. He illustrates that in
the case of Indonesia, Canadian programs and NGOs were imploding after significant
donor funding was removed. These NGOs simply could not exist without sustained aid.
Moreover, he argues that they were unable to raise the necessary funds once the aid was
removed and this was a consequence of not being in favour with the different interests in
the nations who have money, like the undemocratic government. This was similarly
found in the work by Carothers. For example, an early withdrawal can mean successful
programmes being eliminated, as the case of a Nepal’s USAID funded initiative found.
Carothers notes that the successful and well-received project did not receive continued
funding and, consequently, no longer exists.

Considering that the results have already

found that the sustainability of aid is a problematic aspect of Canadian aid, focusing the
aid may actually exacerbate these difficulties in the short-term perspective.
Within this perspective the sustainability of aid is a significant problem in
democracy promotion strategies.

From both the HRD reports and the “Democracy

Project Database”, the results find that aid concentrations jump from nation to nation.
The percentage of overall aid distributions changes throughout the years, as well. As the
charts for Indonesia and Colombia (Chart 1 and 2, respectively) indicate, aid levels fall
and rise significantly from year to year. This signifies that long-term impacts are not

7 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 196
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taken into account. Like Ottaway and Chung’s findings, some of these programmes may
be too expensive for the nations to sustain after programme withdrawal.
It is easy, however, to understand the rationale behind concentrating aid. For
example, current International Co-operation Minister Aileen Carroll notes that by
focusing on too many nations, CIDA was unable to “develop country-specific expertise”
and recipient nations had difficulty coordinating “lots of small-scale projects.”8 As
previously discussed in the literature review, in the study on Serbia, Carothers finds that
the successful aid campaigns were attributable to a large and sustained aid effort.9 This is
similar to the study by Forsythe and Rieffer. Based on the Canadian democratic aid
results, then, one can see how the strategies are not successful.
On the other hand, with the new funding initiatives and the concentration of
assistance, some are sceptical of the actual benefits of restricting aid to the 9 nations
listed in the RPP.

In fact, the report Human Security, Sustainable and Equitable

Development argues that this number could easily be increased to a focus of 20 nations,
allowing more aid to filter into African nations and allowing more inclusion of Asian and
Latin American countries.10 Moreover, there is also a need to be aware of the amount of
funding that other donor nations are giving to specific recipient countries, for if all
nations have similar mechanisms of aid concentration, this may lead to some recipient
nations being oversaturated with funds.11 In fact, it is argued by the World Bank that
while aid effectives calls for increasing aid amounts to good governance nations, “the
international community cannot simply abandon people who live in countries that lack
8 Andrew Mills, “Shakeup on Aid: CIDA to Revamp Aid Strategy.”
9 Thomas Carothers, “Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia,” 5
10 Lois Ross, ed., Human Security, Sustainable and Equitable Development: Foundations fo r C anada’s
International Policy, (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 2004), 9
11 Ibid, 10
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the policies, institutions, and governance necessary” to qualify for these funds.
addition, it is unknown how this will affect the democracy aid budget.

12

In

While CIDA

comments that it is willing to disperse funds to “strategically significant poor-performing
countries” to manage the potential for “failed and fragile states”, it also notes that this
will be accomplished through humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

13

The effects

of democracy aid, however, are not mentioned.
This failure to mention the effects of CIDA policies on democracy aid is not new.
In fact, this was the second major finding of this study. In accordance with Mair’s study,
democracy aid programmes are not being thoroughly evaluated14 and this result is
generalizable to the Canadian initiative, as well. From the interviews, it is evident that
there is agreement that CIDA does not actively measure democracy promotion strategies.
Interestingly, there is currently a study underway to evaluate good governance projects,
but there are challenges with aggregating the data. This is attributable to the difficulties
with this area of study. In fact, Ethier recognizes that it is not possible to determine a
relationship between aid and democratic development.15 While it is true that one is
unable to isolate the impact of Canadian aid alone, one is able to get a sense of the
success and/or failures with individual programmes, especially by examining the
effectiveness of the organization in question.
This study finds significant problems with the agency.

This is no surprise,

however, as the literature review in chapter 2 reveals an organization that has been

12 World Bank, The Role and Effectiveness o f Development Assistance, (Washington: The World Bank,
2002), 38
13 CIDA, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role o f Pride and Influence in the World:
Development, (Gatineau: CIDA, 2005), 24
14 Stefan Mair, “Germany’s Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance: Comparative Advantages, New
Challenges,” in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation fo r Democratization, 131
15 Diane Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives,” 110
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portrayed as excessively bureaucratic, specifically by Greenhill.

The interviewees

contend that the intra-relationship within CIDA is not strong. The branches often work
as separate entities and this is similar to the finding by Morrison. Using the Groupe
Secor report, he finds that the “branches behaved like separate fiefdoms.”16 In fact, the
official from the PKM branch stated that there is “a big disconnect between the branches”
and there is a need to strengthen relationships within the organization. This was also
evidenced by the 2005 OAG report which indicates that CIDA allows each branch to
review its own contribution agreements. Interestingly, these reviews were not carried out
and, consequently, the problems with the agency are far larger than just defective intra
relationships. Communication between CIDA and the outside world is also questionable.
Ethier and Carothers both agree that little information is available in this area of
study.

Ethier, more specifically, notes the difficulty with obtaining full data of

democratic development programmes17 and Carothers notes that most of the information
is informal in nature.18 This is found in this study, as well. Firstly, there is no extensive
database of all CIDA democratic aid programmes available to the public. If one wishes
to obtain such information, there are multiple obstacles, as explained in the previous
chapter. The projects of specific aid programmes are done on an ad hoc nature, with no
detailed examples to give a more complete picture of the circumstances.

The OAG

reports from 1984 to 2000 all document that the evaluation methods were not integrated
within the organization. Individuals did not know about the reports and the learning
processes within the agency were done by word of mouth. In 2000, reporting was done
16 Groupe Secor, “Canadian International Development Agency, Strategic Management Review: Working
Document,” 1991, cited in A id and Ebb Tide: A History o f CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance,
David R. Morrison, 331.
17 Diane Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives,” 110
18 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 9
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by the executing agencies, yet they too were unsure of their responsibilities to CIDA.
Personal experience also validated these findings, as CIDA was not cooperative in the
interview process or information consolidation. This was also evident to the individuals
interviewed after the 2004 CIDA International Cooperation Days and there are even
examples of NGOs and their affiliates who argue this to be true. El-Khodari, Olivero and
the CBIE have all had questionable experiences with the organization. Together, this
portrays the institution as closed in nature, with inadequate levels of transparency.
Goldfarb’s study also indicates the problem with CIDA’s funding management.
In her study of ODA levels for the agency, despite their corruption levels, she finds that
nations such as Bangladesh receive high levels of aid. This is similar to the findings in
this study.

The interviews reveal that governance plays a more important role than

democratization levels in a nation, yet some of the largest recipients, like China,
Vietnam, Russia and Haiti all have their fair share of difficulties with good governance.
Yet, in this area of study, there is a difficulty with disbursing funds solely to “good
governance” or democratic states, as the goal of this type of aid is to increase the
effectiveness in these areas. It does not make any sense to aid nations that are already
progressed. Interestingly, Canadian democratic aid does. In fact, nearly $15.3 million
has been spent on “fully free”, level 1 nations. Another $53.8 million has been spent on
level 1.5 countries.

This is a significant amount of money that could be spent in

developing non-democratic nations.

Consequently, this is seen as ineffective use of

these resources. In addition to these questionable decisions, the Auditor General reports
reveal that CIDA “released a high proportion of ineligible expense.”19 It also paid more

19 OAG, “2005 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 5 - Status Report, Canadian International
Development Agency: Financial Compliance Audits and Managing Contracts and Contributions,” 5.61
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for certain services, as evidenced by their own report on sole-source contracts and the
Yeltsin Democracy Fellowship Programme. Again, these are all funds that should be
spent strengthening civil society or building institutional capacity in newly democratizing
nations.
While it is true that the agency has mismanaged some of the funds, it is also true
that the bulk of the aid does go to pseudo-democracies, those nations that are most
willing to make the full transition towards democratization. As a result, this study’s
hypothesis was correct. There is a curvilinear relationship between Canadian democratic
aid and the democracy level in the recipient nations, as measured by the Freedom House
index. This is similar to the findings of Macdonald and Hoddinott, Alesina and Dollar,
and Berthelemy and Tichit with some key differences. While these studies used ODA to
measure levels of aid, this study shows how it is applicable to the specific area of
democratic aid. It does differ from Macdonald and Hoddinott’s study in an important
way. The bulk of the aid in their study goes to “fully free” nations,

20

•

•

while in this case,

the “partially free”, those nations in the 3 to 5 categories, receive the most funding.
Alesina and Dollar’s study found that democratizing nations received more aid after the
transition phase and that, on the whole, democratic nations received more aid.21 In this
study, however, democratizing nations receive more democratic aid.

It is counter

intuitive to fund completely democratic nations, as the sole purpose is to increase their
democracy levels. The fact that aid was not concentrated in the nations with democracy
levels of 6 or 7 indicates that more democratic nations receive more aid. Berthelemy and
Tichit’s study found that assistance flows were impacted by certain freedoms, as
20 Ryan Macdonald and John Hoddinott, “Determinants o f Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations:
Humanitarian, Commercial or Political? 306
21 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” 34 and 40
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measured by the Freedom House index, but there were also a number of different
relationships within their studies, which in many ways is similar to Alesina and Dollar’s
analysis.

Like this study, there is a trend that shows a relationship between

democratization levels and aid levels, but there are also other factors that may play a role
in determining aid.

This was evidenced from the interview portion and CIDA

documentation. The PKM official notes that it is related to requests and research, with
the majority of funding distributed according to CIDA priorities. The officer from the
Asia branch notes that democratization levels are not important in determining aid, as
significant programmes have existed in non-democratic states like China and Vietnam. If
one examines the CIDA literature, it becomes clear that humanitarian, political and
commercial reasons are also important, with China, Vietnam and Chile all illustrating
these ulterior motives. Despite these findings, CIDA actually does not explain who gets
democratic aid or why. The 2002 document on strengthening aid effectiveness briefly
lists the pre-requisites of the Canada Fund for Africa, but it is significantly vague. It
states that selection is based on “their use of aid effectiveness principles” like local
ownership or donor coordination with a “commitment to democracy, good governance
and human rights.”22 Better public justification would allow for greater understanding of
the selection process, illustrating a more open and transparent organization.
The results, thus far, are not surprising.

Even the definitions at CIDA are

inadequate. From the interviews, the concept of democracy among CIDA staff is distinct,
indicating a difficulty with how these terms are communicated within the organization.
From the literature review, it is shown that CIDA’s official definition is comparable to

22 CIDA, Canada M aking a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid
Effectiveness, 26.
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Diamond’s liberal theory of democracy. Yet, this official definition is seen as being
“flexible”, according to the officer from the PKM branch. The officer from the Asia
branch argues that there is more of a focus on governance instead of democratization.
From the two views, there is a sense that the various branches have distinct ways of
conceptualization and, hence, Crawford’s view of there not being a clear definition of
democracy is more reasonable.

The most disturbing feature, however, is the lack of

recognition of pseudo-democracies or authoritarian states. Without clear definitions of
the different states, it is impossible for CIDA to adjust their programming to correspond
with the levels of democratization in the recipient nations. This is a problematic aspect
that Carothers addresses in the “End of Transition Paradigm.” Moreover, the official
definitions are also outdated, first instituted in 1995. In fact, Tomlinson’s study mentions
this, as well.
Like Tomlinson’s study, an examination of CIDA programming and the
interviews reveal that projects listed under democracy aid actually encompass a larger
area of programming. For example, in the chapter on methodology, it was noted that
some of the programmes in the “Democracy Project Database” include headings like
“child protection” or some projects only contain 4% of a democratic priority. From the
interviews, both officers made it clear that almost all projects are listed as democratic
ones, despite their limited nature. In some of these cases, the projects make up a greater
portion of poverty reduction strategies or environmental aid. The extent, however, is not
indicated in any of these databases. This is also problematic in its own right, as there is
no suggestion of the relationships between these different CIDA aid areas.

Ill
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Besides the lack of communication, misspending, and lack of concentration for
programming, the results also reveal problems with the democracy projects themselves.
This, in fact, is comparable to the work of Carothers, Santiso and Ottaway. Overall
negative findings are not uncommon in this field of study. While the case studies by
CIDA are vague and generalized, their findings are very similar to the literature. The
official from the Asia branch notes that while there have been great expectations in the
area of democracy promotion, there was not a single country where great strides have
been made.

Similarly, Santiso’s study of the democracy assistance policies concluded

that the strategies employed “have fallen short of their intended impact and
effectiveness.”23 This is best seen in the examples of East Timor and West Africa. In
East Timor, money was administered into organizations that were not able to absorb and
use it efficiently. More generally, the official from the Asia branch recognizes that there
was reluctance in the countries to make changes to the area of rule of law. An important
aspect of a successful programme, then, involves the cooperation of the government. The
case by Crawford similarly finds that there is a limited impact of these programmes.
Countries, in most cases, are able to resist any negative punitive measures, illustrating
that aid can be given, but there is no incentive for increasing the democratic level in the
recipient nation.24 Improving democracy, then, must come from within.
In the case of West Africa, CIDA has an extensive list of how to improve
programming, yet it does not examine or explain the specific problems in this report.
Despite this, the organization does note that there must be “good knowledge of the

23 Carlos Santiso, “International Cooperation for Democracy and Good Governance: Moving Toward a
Second Generation,” European Journal o f Development Research, 4
24 Gordon Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues o f Effectiveness and Consistency,”
81
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environment.”25 This is comparable to the study on Romania by Carothers. In Romania,
the experts did not know enough about the country and hence, many of the programmes
did not acknowledge the root of the problems.

In fact, during the interviews, it was

revealed that it is important to know where and how to intervene, being conscious of
inadvertent consequences. The Corporate Evaluation on Haiti illustrated that a number of
factors contributed to the lack of effectiveness of projects in this country, including the
weakness of the local partners and the unwillingness of CIDA to take into account local
realities.27

The report Strengthening Aid Effectiveness does recognize all these

weaknesses, within the larger context of foreign aid, but it is not enough to solely
recognize these problems.

Continually, one is struck by the lack of analysis and

examples in these reports.
This is one of the largest arguments: if an organization does not have adequate
evaluation methods and does not examine the extent of successful programming with
meaningful examples, it is impossible for it to leam from previous experiences. More
importantly, it is difficult for it to suggest specific improvements. In the 1993 OAG
report, it was stated that CIDA had “no formal mechanism or requirement to capture
lessons learned or to use them.”

7 o

%

The 1998 OAG report indicates that while there were

increased numbers of evaluations, none of the projects examined the long term effects of
the programme,29 while the 2000 report indicates that the executing agencies are the ones

25 CIDA, Democratic D evelopment and Human Rights (DDHR): West Africa, 6.21
26 Thomas Carothers, A ssessing D emocracy Assistance: The Case o f Romania, 4 1 and 55
27 CIDA, Corporate Evaluation o f the Canadian Cooperation Program in Haiti (1994-2002), 14
28 OAG, “ 1993 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 12, Canadian International Development Agency:
Bilateral Economic and Social Development Programs,” 12.100
29 OAG, “1998 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 21, Canadian International Development Agency:
Geographic Programmes,” 21.37
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doing the evaluations.30 The case of West Africa’s report illustrates that there are many
ways to improve aid, yet how does one translate these suggestions into meaningful
actions?
available.

CIDA does not deal with this publicly and these reports are not widely
By not making accessible these essential documents and case studies,

however, CIDA is also missing out on valuable independent research opportunities. This
is why there are so few studies of Canadian democratic aid.
In sum, the results from the study were similar to the findings in the existing
research. Like Goldfarb’s study on CIDA grants, Canadian democratic aid is widely
dispersed, with examples of undemocratic nations receiving a large portion of the aid.
This is seen in the case of China and Vietnam.

Like Ottaway and Chung’s and

Carothers’ findings, the question of sustainability plays an important role in Canadian
aid. There are instances where Canada prematurely withdraws and consequently, this has
led to NGOs and programmes in developing nations to implode.

Greenhill and

Morrison’s arguments of CIDA are also replicated here. There are significant problems
with cooperation among the various branches and CIDA is an excessively bureaucratic
organization. These problems extend to the lack of information and difficulties with
obtaining data, which both Ethier and Carothers have noted. While CIDA may give aid
to the pseudo-democracies on aggregate levels, more specific examples have also shown
a variety of reasons for dispersing the aid. Together, this indicates an agency that has
significant problems, affecting its ability to carry out its effective programming. In order
to reverse this trend, CIDA needs to be more open and transparent. It needs to address

30 OAG, “2000 Report o f the Auditor General: Chapter 14, Canadian International Development Agency:
Managing Contracts and Contribution Agreements,” 14.85
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the issues o f project evaluations and, more importantly, the agency must make the
information available to the public.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In some of the literature, CIDA has been portrayed as ineffective and highly
bureaucratic. These unfortunate findings were replicated in this study, as well. CIDA is
the primary institution responsible for democratic aid. Despite this, there is very little
reporting done on these programmes. The organization is closed natured and it lacks the
transparency that is needed to provide effective and meaningful projects. There are faults
with funding initiatives and project sustainability, with aid programmes that are
excessively dispersed.

Together, the institution is portrayed as being defective, with

ineffective democracy promotion strategies.
The single most important finding in this study is the lack of evaluation methods
and participation with the outside world.

This is evident from the Auditor General

reports, the consultation process of Canada Making a Difference in the World, and
various other CIDA documents. The OAG reports indicate a progression from 1984.
Programme officers, themselves, did not know about the studies at CIDA and
consequently, there was little knowledge of the workings of the institution.

The

following reports did not note much of an improvement, with project evaluations being
done on an ad hoc basis. There are important implications associated with this, mainly
that there is more freedom for NGOs to deviate from their goals and there is less
opportunity for CIDA to learn from their mistakes. Even today, there is evidence that the
evaluation methods are less than adequate, with the use of executing agencies and
monitors to report the progress. In 1993, some CIDA officials were not cooperative with
the Auditor General’s staff and the interview process also showed that few were
interested in participating in this democracy aid study. Some CIDA personnel did not
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even return the calls of individuals in other governmental departments.
coordinators have noted questionable experiences with CIDA.

NGO

Together, there is

overwhelming evidence that reporting methods are faulty and relationships are strained.
This was also the personal experience of the author.
In addition to this problem or as a result of it, CIDA has difficulties with funding
initiatives and project sustainability. The issue of sole-source contracts illustrates that
there were instances where more qualified candidates were not considered. Without open
competition, CIDA is paying more for its contracts and, again, there was an issue with the
lack of reviews in this area. In other cases, CIDA released expenses without proper
documentation. These are all funds that should be used for promoting democracy. As for
project sustainability, an interview revealed that aid was being prematurely withdrawn in
certain areas.

This was despite the fact that the programmes were effective.

The

difficulties with project sustainability are also evidenced from the “Democracy Project
Database.”
When meaningful democratic aid amounts are examined from 1990 to 2005, it is
clear that the aid is greatly dispersed. Democratic assistance is awarded to 158 nations,
each with varying amounts. From CIDA documents, it is also clear that there is no single
regional branch garnering highly concentrated funding levels. Individual examinations,
however, show that within a country aid levels fluctuate greatly from year to year. CIDA
HRD reports indicate that country priorities also change.

While more democratizing

nations receive more aid, there is still a considerable amount of it going to fully
democratic nations, within the categories of 1 to 1.5 on the Freedom House index.
Together, these results show that even funding is done on an ad hoc nature, without clear
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guidelines for stable funding.

Again, this shows CIDA’s inconsistency and this is

unarguable unhealthy for democratic consolidation in these developing nations.
Democratization is, after all, a lengthy process.
Finally, the interview phase of the study elicited little participation. Despite this,
the interviewees provided important insight into the inter-organizational capacity and
relationships at CIDA.

There is little communication between the branches and the

organization does not actively measure results for democratization.

Specific

examinations of their experiences revealed that there are both successes and failures in
promoting democracy abroad, with some of the more significant problems including the
need for more localized initiatives and more cooperation with the recipient governments.
The need for more modest expectations was also mentioned. CIDA reports also specify
the need for better knowledge of the nation. Interestingly, the reports that are available
from the agency are not clear. They lack vision and specific examples. One does not get
a sense of the true programming and this is very inopportune.
There are a number of limitations with this study. It is difficult to make vast
generalizations from the interviews, as a small rate of return was noted. Yet, this in itself
is an important conclusion, especially with the addition of information from CIDA and
the OAG reports. In the future, contacting more individuals at the agency could yield
better results or a snowballing effect should be used to increase participation rates. This
would allow individuals within the organizations to point out those who are willing to
participate in such studies. Had this been the case here, however, the results from the
lack of participation would not have been indicated.
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There are also issues with the “Democracy Project Database.” While this study
was careful to ensure that only meaningful projects were included in the re-coded
version, there are no controls over the actual priority level that is entered into the system.
Over the 15 year period, there may have been a problem with the continuity of
measurement.

Individuals may see different programmes as having different priority

levels. Considering that there is no actual definition of what constitutes a democratic
programme or how the levels of priorities should be measured, there may have been
projects that overestimated or underestimated the level of democratic priority.
Additionally, the Freedom House index has been noted to have its own methodological
problems. For example, the University of Essex illustrates that there are troubles with
validity, as it is “technically a measure of freedom not democracy.”1 There is also a
problem with reliability, as Tatu Vanhanen mentions the difficulty of checking the coding
of the variables.2 Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen also contend that there is no set of
coding rules and no justification for their checklist of indicators, so scholars are not able
to reanalyze the data and “in the end, the aggregate data offered by Freedom House has to
be accepted largely on faith.”3 The University of Essex also illustrates how the final
number can be problematic, as it does not accurately reflect the combination between
civil and political liberties.4

Despite these shortcomings, it is still the most

comprehensive unit of study for this specific investigation.

As explained in the

1 Todd Landman and Julia Hausermann, eds., M ap-M aking and Analysis o f the Main International
Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance, 10
2 Tatu Vanhanen, “A N ew Dataset for Measruing Dem ocracy, 1810-1998,” Journal o f Peace Research, vol
37(2) (2000): 262
3 Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating
Alternative Indices,” Comparative Political Studies, vol 35(1) (February 2002): 20-21, 21
4 Todd Landman and Julia Hausermann, eds., M ap-M aking and Analysis o f the Main International

Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and G ood Governance, 10
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methodology chapter, it is the most widely available form of measurement and it has
been extensively used by many scholars to measure democratization.
Without a doubt, the area of Canadian democracy promotion strategies is
understudied. Of course, this is partly due to the difficulties with obtaining information,
which is a main finding of this project. Even when information is available from CIDA,
it does not address the fundamental issue of democracy aid effectiveness. The reports are
vague and generalized.

From the review of CIDA literature on democracy and

democratic aid, it becomes clear that CIDA downplays the importance of this area of
study. Thus far, more than $1 billion has been spent on meaningful democratic aid. In
the future, it is essential to understand the reasons why democratic aid is not as visible as
poverty reduction. More importantly, it is crucial to evaluate why CIDA fails to conduct
reports. This, however, can only be achieved by gaining insight to the organization itself,
which this study has proved is a challenging task.
This study did not examine the greater nature of democracy promotion strategies,
focusing solely on CIDA as a donor organization. While CIDA is certainly the most
active within this community at the Canadian level, there are still important actors and
dimensions that could be included. From a report by CIDA, the case of South Africa
illustrated the diverse and inter-connected relationship between aid agencies, aid donors,
public pressures and the leadership of the Prime Minister.

It may be necessary to

examine how all the factors are inter-related, expanding the study to different donor
organizations and NGOs, government elected officials and other departments like
Foreign Affairs.

It may also be useful to examine non-fiduciary sources of aid, like

sanctions, as the case on South Africa has shown. This was evident with the use o f sports

120

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

bans, visa restrictions and South African tourism limits.5 At the same time, there also
needs to be a more comprehensive assessment of the intricate relationship between
democratization, poverty reduction programs, capacity development and environmental
needs.6 As noted previously, democratization and the process of consolidation have
many differing factors.

While democracy assistance is often categorized within the

auspices of greater aid in CIDA, more studies should examine the relationship between
these diverse factors, as well. A study on multi-lateral relationships between CIDA and
other organizations would also prove worthwhile.

Do the difficulties with CIDA

transcend into these multi-lateral organizations? Finally, who gets Canadian democratic
aid and why? While qualitative results from this study indicate that more democratic
nations receive more aid within the sphere of pseudo-democracies, how important are
other factors? This would require a quantitative examination o f the “Democracy Project
Database”, using other variables like trade levels, human rights, and corruption indexes.
Together, the measure of effectiveness is a result of aid dispersal, organizational
constraints and evaluation methods. As is evidenced from this thesis, the sum of these
results portrays an ineffective institution and policies that are not conducive to promoting
meaningful democratic development. In order to overcome this, CIDA will have to be
more careful with their aid choices, conduct better programme evaluations across a
variety of project areas and change their institutional bureaucratic image into a more open
and transparent organization. By no means, is this an easy task, but this thesis has shown
that the current method is not working. There must be greater accountability and greater

5 CIDA, Choosing the Right Policy Levers: Drawing Lessons fro m the Government o f C anada’s
Interventions in South Africa, (Gatineau: CIDA, 1995), point 6.
6 Kate Schecter, “The Social Sector: A Failure o f the Transition,” in Nations in Transit: 1999-2000: Civil

Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States, 38
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public involvement.

Only then will Canadian democracy promotion strategies

effective and worthwhile initiatives.
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Appendix A:
List of Departments Contacted for Interviews

Africa and Middle East Branch (AMEB)
Atlantic West African Programme
Canada Fund for Africa Secretariat
Central Africa and Great Lakes Programme
Eastern Africa and the Horn Program
Gulf of Guinea
North Africa and Middle East
Panaffican and Francophonie Programme
Knowledge Management for Programming and Operations
Sahael and Ivory Coast Programme
Southern Africa Programme

Americas Branch (AMER)
Andes Programme
Southern Com
Central America Division
Commonwealth Caribbean/Suriname Division
Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic
Inter-American Programme

Asia Branch (ASIA)
Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka Division
Bangladesh Division
China Division
Indonesia, Philippines, Timor Leste and South Pacific
Mainland South East Asia
Pakistan Division
Southeast Asia Regional Programme
Strategic Planning and Policy Division

Central and Eastern European Branch (CEE)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Division
Central Asia and Caucuses Programme
Peace, Security and Governance
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Russia, Ukraine and Nuclear Programs Division

Performance and Knowledge Management Branch
Evaluation Branch - 2
Results-Based Management Branch -2

Policy Branch
Governance and Social Development - Democratic Institutions and Conflict
individuals.
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Appendix B:
Questionnaire:
Canada Promoting Democracy Abroad: Success and/or Failure?

CIDA

1. How does CIDA allocate funds to the various aid recipient countries?
A. What role does the amount of democratization play in receiving aid? Is
democratization a pre-requisite of aid?
B. How important are strategic interests to CIDA?
C. Do recipient countries actively seek out aid and, if so, by what processes?
How does this affect fund allocation?
D. What, ultimately, makes CIDA allocate funds to certain countries (and not
others)?
2. Has there been a change in the concept of democracy over time at CIDA? How
does this affect your work?
3. What is the relationship between CIDA and other governmental agencies? What
is the relationship between CIDA and the ICHRDD? Is there both horizontal and
vertical integration among the branches and agencies?
4. As a researcher, what have been some of the major problems or set backs that you
have encountered when promoting democracy abroad?
5. How does CIDA measure and monitor democratic development in recipient
nations? Do you agree with its methods?
6. Ultimately, how successful are CIDA’s democracy promotion strategies? Are
they encouraging democratic development?
A. If yes, how so?
B. If no, how does CIDA intend to rectify this problem? How would you rectify
this problem?
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Appendix C:
Ethics Review Clearance Letter
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WI N D S O R
O ffice o f Research Services

REB #04-165

O ctober 26, 2004

ivls. M ary Pardi
D epartm ent o f Political Science
U niversity o f W ind so r
W indsor, ON N9B 3P4
D ear Ms. Pardi,
Subject:

“Canada prom oting dem ocracy abroad: success and/or failure?

T his letter is in response to yo ur application for ethics review of your Masters project at the
U niversity o f W indsor. The U niversity o f W indsor Research Ethics Board (REB) has reviewed the
above noted study. I am pleased to inform you that the proposal has been cleared by the Board for
a period o f one year.
As indicated i the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research I ivolving Humans
you are required to do the follow ing:
Subm it a Progress R eport if your project extends beyond one year;
Notify the REB when yo ur project is completed;
S ubm it a R equest to Revise fo r any modifications to your project;
Contact the O ffice o f Research Services immediately regarding adverse events or
unexpected events.
Forms fo r subm ission/notification to the REB are available at the Office of Research Se -vices’ W eb
Site: w w w .uw indsor.ca/reb.
Please be sure that your supervisor com pletes and returns to the Research Ethics C oordinator the
enclosed sheet to indicate w hen your project was completed.
W e wish you every success in your research.

/Y ltd b stfrerv^
M aureen H. Muldoon, Ph.D.
Chair, University Research Ethics Board
cc:

Dr. Anna Lanoszka, D epartm ent o f Political Science
Linda Bunn, Research Ethics C oordinator
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Appendix D;
Tables
Table 4
Meaningful Democratic Aid Spending by CIDA in all Nations by Amounts
From 1990-2005
Country
Korea, North
Kuwait
Syrian Arab Rep
Kiribati Rep
Samoa
Singapore
Tuvalu
St. Kitts Nevis
Australia
United Kingdom
Vanuatu
Papua New Guinea
Anguilla
Iran
Liberia
Lao, Democratic Rep
Korea, South
St. Vincent & Grenada
Austria
American Samoa
Saudi Arabia
Solomon Islands
Libya
Rep. Fiji Island
Barbados
Tongo
USA
Antigua Barbuda
Israel
Belize
Saint Lucia
Grenada
Venezuela
Uruguay

Am ount Spent
$0.00
$500.00
$500.00
$758.05
$758.05
$758.05
$758.05
$759.65
$975.00
$975.00
$1,080.69
$1,110.00
$1,715.60
$2,377.12
$3,230.00
$3,377.18
$3,500.00
$3,742.95
$4,175.00
$5,831.00
$8,000.00
$8,000.00
$10,131.52
$10,553.00
$11,443.55
$11,622.00
$12,000.00
$13,746.10
$19,999.00
$20,603.96
$62,909.65
$79,217.95
$80,130.21
$91,638.01
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$149,160.94
$153,644.25
$171,638.60
$172,339.42
$188,914.91
$225,000.00
$234,534.55
$239,991.91
$304,031.82
$331,524.49
$334,472.91
$336,781.43

Dominican Republic
Turkmenistan
Panama
Trinidad Tobago
Slovenia
Japan
Belarus
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea
Sao Tome and
Principe
Djibouti
Comoros
Yemen
Mauritius
Seychelles
Moldova
Puerto Rico
Congo Brazzaville
Turkey
Bulgaria
Paraguay
Guinea-Bissau
Kazakhstan Rep
Togo
Cape Verde
Madagascar
Gambia
Central African Rep.
Costa Rica
Myanmar (Burma)
Nambia
Somali Rep.
Honduras
Argentina
Chad
Mauritania
Albania
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Angola
Chile
Croatia

$342,455.09
$346,207.26
$355,010.09
$362,814.64
$453,131.21
$485,113.04
$506,391.72
$535,181.00
$540,799.48
$719,692.19
$792,309.80
$813,796.11
$861,182.82
$897,771.87
$900,176.07
$948,476.26
$1,000,485.95
$1,003,727.91
$1,004,837.16
$1,130,770.00
$1,281,268.78
$1,330,662.98
$1,463,554.01
$1,506,845.20
$1,540,453.86
$1,544,452.81
$1,551,292.38
$1,700,866.57
$1,852,276.73
$1,858,420.89
$2,072,108.63
$2,102,140.56
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$2,151,246.00
$2,166,293.85
$2,284,222.34
$2,323,506.65
$2,333,602.02
$2,741,484.83
$2,971,769.95
$3,020,554.04
$3,031,387.55
$3,160,209.25
$3,200,832.84
$3,268,330.06
$3,288,653.82
$3,339,239.04
$3,380,129.40
$3,385,103.58
$3,457,454.01
$3,481,982.18
$3,526,388.07
$3,562,846.63
$3,573,455.62
$3,608,949.83
$3,618,202.57
$3,668,441.74
$3,816,512.23
$4,126,399.11
$4,213,583.98
$4,281,005.87
$4,872,152.65
$5,171,046.17
$5,184,466.92
$5,439,535.41
$5,465,398.29
$5,920,939.69
$6,490,192.58
$6,698,335.02
$6,873,916.49
$7,176,281.80
$7,250,279.68
$7,283,762.75
$7,518,115.77
$7,584,437.18
$8,092,627.27
$8,264,361.18
$9,268,843.88

Iraq
Armenia
Lesotho
Bhutan
Algeria
Czech Republic
Poland
Mexico
Malaysia
Nicaragua
Niger
Lithuania
Uganda
Jordan
Macedonia
Hungary
Ecuador
Georgia
Latvia
Gabon
Malawi
Swaziland
El Salvador
Estonia
Romania
Tunisia
Nigeria
Jamaica
Sudan
Eritrea
Burundi
Brazil
Slovakia
Guatemala
Sierre Leone
Afghanistan
Lebanon
Timor, East
Morocco
Guyana
Cote d'Ivoire
Zambia
Palestinian Tocp
Colombia
Congo Kinshasha
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$9,404,588.26
$9,685,072.93
$9,723,953.37
$9,769,134.49
$9,784,230.24
$10,484,417.76
$10,790,436.10
$11,247,528.98
$11,334,879.55
$12,681,177.61
$13,381,716.37
$13,545,842.78
$13,622,022.97
$14,448,616.94
$14,560,318.57
$14,605,153.85
$14,610,397.71
$14,767,604.22
$14,874,240.49
$15,994,686.99
$16,578,079.06
$18,712,095.48
$20,957,953.47
$21,018,089.46
$22,501,586.10
$23,542,916.98
$23,834,589.83
$24,677,851.57
$25,887,021.28
$26,459,369.23
$27,530,554.42
$28,718,812.18
$29,338,786.73
$47,821,894.16
$50,602,332.52
$52,867,268.61

Zimbabwe
Benin
Cuba
Botswana
Tanzania
Guinea
Mozambique
Cambodia
Nepal
Kenya
Serbia Montenegro
Bolivia
Canada
Bosnia Herzegovina
Egypt
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Senegal
Bangladesh
Peru
Burkino Faso
Ghana
Cameroon
Thailand
South Africa
Mali
Philippines
India
Haiti
China
Vietnam
Russia
Indonesia
Ukraine

$953,025,285.69

Total
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Table 5
Meaningful Democratic Aid Spending by CIDA in all Nations in Alphabetical Order
From 1990-2005

Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Angola
Anguilla
Antigua Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkino Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo Brazzaville
Congo Kinshasha

Am ount Spent
$6,698,335.02
$1,551,292.38
$2,333,602.02
$5,831.00
$1,858,420.89
$1,715.60
$13,746.10
$1,506,845.20
$2,166,293.85
$975.00
$4,175.00
$1,852,276.73
$16,578,079.06
$11,443.55
$234,534.55
$20,603.96
$9,685,072.93
$2,323,506.65
$13,545,842.78
$14,448,616.94
$9,769,134.49
$5,439,535.41
$719,692.19
$20,957,953.47
$5,184,466.92
$11,247,528.98
$22,501,586.10
$13,622,022.97
$900,176.07
$1,003,727.91
$1,540,453.86
$2,072,108.63
$28,718,812.18
$8,264,361.18
$346,207.26
$535,181.00
$9,268,843.88
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$1,004,837.16
$7,518,115.77
$2,102,140.56
$9,723,953.37
$2,741,484.83
$342,455.09
$149,160.94
$3,457,454.01
$14,560,318.57
$3,618,202.57
$334,472.91
$5,171,046.17
$3,668,441.74
$14,610,397.71
$3,562,846.63
$1,000,485.95
$3,481,982.18
$21,018,089.46
$79,217.95
$5,920,939.69
$10,484,417.76
$813,796.11
$7,283,762.75
$27,530,554.42
$1,463,554.01
$3,385,103.58
$26,459,369.23
$50,602,332.52
$2,377.12
$2,151,246.00
$19,999.00
$4,281,005.87
$225,000.00
$3,339,239.04
$861,182.82
$12,681,177.61
$758.05
$0.00
$3,500.00
$500.00
$1,700,866.57
$3,377.18
$3,526,388.07
$6,873,916.49
$2,284,222.34

Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan Rep
Kenya
Kiribati Rep
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao, Democratic Rep
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
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$3,230.00
$10,131.52
$3,268,330.06
$3,380,129.40
$948,476.26
$3,573,455.62
$3,031,387.55
$24,677,851.57
$362,814.64
$1,544,452.81
$3,020,554.04
$485,113.04
$239,991.91
$7,250,279.68
$10,790,436.10
$1,130,770.00
$1,281,268.78
$11,334,879.55
$3,160,209.25
$3,200,832.84
$4,213,583.98
$14,874,240.49
$8,092,627.27
$171,638.60
$1,110.00
$792,309.80
$18,712,095.48
$25,887,021.28
$2,971,769.95
$506,391.72
$10,553.00
$3,816,512.23
$47,821,894.16
$14,605,153.85
$62,909.65
$758.05
$336,781.43

Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar (Burma)
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Palestinian Tocp
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Puerto Rico
Rep. Fiji Island
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Lucia
Samoa
Sao Tome and
Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierre Leone
Singapore
Slovakia

$8,000.00
$15,994,686.99
$13,381,716.37
$453,131.21
$6,490,192.58
$758.05
$5,465,398.29
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$188,914.91
$8,000.00
$1,330,662.98
$23,834,589.83
$14,767,604.22
$759.65
$3,742.95
$4,872,152.65
$3,608,949.83
$500.00
$304,031.82
$9,784,230.24
$23,542,916.98
$7,176,281.80
$897,771.87
$11,622.00
$172,339.42
$4,126,399.11
$540,799.48
$153,644.25
$758.05
$3,288,653.82
$52,867,268.61
$975.00
$91,638.01
$12,000.00
$331,524.49
$1,080.69
$80,130.21
$29,338,786.73
$355,010.09
$7,584,437.18
$9,404,588.26

Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somali Rep.
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts Nevis
St. Vincent & Grenada
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Rep
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor, East
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Uruguay
USA
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table 6
Cumulative Total of Meaningful Democratic Aid Spending by CIDA in all Nations
From 1990-2005 by Freedom House Rating

Freedom House
Rating
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7

A m ount Spent
$15,369,818.18
$53,846,046.53
$45,325,894.42
$107,307,487.48
$56,875,860.53
$114,238,710.29
$111,336,251.17
$68,851,347.34
$98,946,996.03
$94,011,729.69
$64,660,616.74
$73,817,493.90
$44,399,010.37
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